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ABSTRACT
Fines and fees for legal violations finance American criminal justice systems but often at a
severe cost to those incurring fines and fees. While fines and fees are a long-standing feature of
the United States criminal justice system, the use of fines and fees recently captured attention of
scholars in the wake of questions prompted by recent social, political, and legal developments.
The central question is: What, if any, association is there between race, socioeconomic
disadvantage, and county fine and fee issuance? The main hypothesis is: Fine and fee issuance of
the most populous counties positively and significantly associate with race and socioeconomic
disadvantage. To test this hypothesis, census data and multivariate regressions are exploited to
examine associations between county fine and fee issuance, race, and socioeconomic
disadvantage. Conflict-oriented theory serves to rationalize findings. A conflict theorist would
expect areas with comparatively low socioeconomic status and high concentrations of certain
minorities to fine relatively heavily. The findings from this study indicate confirmation that
counties with a higher percentage of Black residents issue more fines and fees on a per capita
basis than counties with a lower percentage of Black residents. Yet, the findings from this study
fall short of indicating counties with comparatively low socioeconomic status are more likely to
issue fines and fees.
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Chapter One
Fines, Fees, Race, and Socioeconomic Disadvantage
For this project, county issuance of fines and fees for violations of the law, including
those imposed for crimes, traffic violations, court usage, defense attorneys, probation fees, “payto-stay” fees requiring inmate payment for incarceration, 1 interest, and collection charges
reported in Code U30 of the U.S. Census are examined. 2 In this chapter, the assumptions,
background, contributions, delimitations, framework, hypotheses, limitations, questions, terms,
problems, and purpose of this project are identified.
Background
The use of fines as punishment traces back to ancient times, e.g., Athenian Constitution 3
(Atkinson, 2015). Yet, Colonial Americans emphasized rehabilitation as many colonists disliked
debtor prisons in England (Mann, 2002; Ressler, 2006). Accordingly, in the main, America
avoided fines and fees until she let all enslaved free (Adamson, 1983; Oshinsky, 1996; Harris et
al., 2010). In the twelve years following the Civil War, known as Reconstruction, Blacks made
gains in terms of employment, rights, and holding office (Blackmon, 2008). Yet, it is claimed,
threatened economic and political forces resented loss of control over the system (Wacquant,
2006). Some argue this loss of control resulted in Southern leaders turning to the criminal justice
system to maintain control over society (Wacquant, 2006; Blackmon, 2008). 4

1

In one study, $13,000 is the average legal debt for inmates leaving prison (deVuono-Powell, 2015).

Code: U30 of the Census of Governments requires each locality to report fines and fees relating to violations of
law and excludes fees such as building permits or tax delinquencies (Goldstein et al., 2020, p. 11).

2

The term “to pay a fine” initial appearance in the law arrived in 1383 (Zamist & Sichel, 1982). This work offers a
comprehensive early history of fines and fees while also providing an illumining overview of the mechanics of fine
and fee implementation.

3

1

Reliance on fines and fees made possible the convict lease system operating until the
1940s (Oshinsky, 1996; Harris et al., 2010, p. 1758). The ability to lease convicts to corporations
enhanced after a disputed election led to a political settlement (The Compromise of 1877)
handing the keys of the Oval Office to Republican Rutherford Hayes in exchange for such
concessions as the end of Reconstruction and removal of federal troops tasked with building a
more egalitarian South (Bensel, 2000, p. 5; Valelly, 2004, pp. 48-49). When Reconstruction
(1865-1877) withered, fine and fee issuance flourished in many areas of the South (Adamson,
1983). Du Bois (1997) offers a succinct description of this era, recounting that the “slave went
free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery” (p. 30). Fines
fueled the convict lease system as many incurred fines and fees in amounts several times greater
than annual incomes (Blackmon, 2008). Justice officials leased convicts to corporations
(Blackmon, 2008). Some claim, in exchange for inmate labor in mines, railroads, and farm
plantations, corporations indirectly paid salaries of sheriffs and judges by paying fines owed by
convicts (Adamson, 1983; Harris et al., 2010). In this way, it is argued, fines and fees played a
central role maintaining the criminal justice system through racial and class domination (Harris
et al., 2010).
The convict lease system concluded in the 1940s, as politicians plotted to settle political
scores with rivals relying on convict labor or placate rebelling free miners who lost jobs to
inmates (Mancini, 1978). For several decades after the conclusion of the convict lease system,
fines and fees were infrequently imposed in comparison to the convict lease era and present
(Martin, et al., 2018). Yet, eventually, American criminal justice systems again engaged in

Wacquant (2006) explains, after Emancipation, racial and class domination was an objective of a Southern society
seeking to regain the benefits of forced Black labor and also to sustain the status differences between Whites and
Blacks (pp. 45-46).

4

2

widespread fine and fee issuance. More indirectly and, in time, large-scale state expropriations of
criminal labor resumed. This reliance upon fines and fees dovetails with an increase in crime and
the concomitment response to that crime.
Beginning after World War II, crime generally began to increase in the United States
with a peak occurring in the mid 1970s to the early 1990s. This progression of crime may help
explain why, in the last several decades, local governments grew increasingly reliant upon fines
and fees (Council of Economic Advisers, Dec. 2015, p. 2; Shannon et al., 2020).
The 1970s War on Crime and the 1980s War on Drugs increased fines and fees for
offenders (Shapiro, 2014, May 19). Elevating levels of fine and fee issuance help account for
skyrocketing expenditures associated with mass incarceration, transferring much of the everincreasing cost of the criminal justice system from the state to defendants (Atkinson, 2015). As
the criminal justice system subsumed a more active and expensive role in society, deficit-plagued
governments created novel categories of fees, 5 and expanded the net of fines to petty ordinance
violations (Eisen, 2014). By the 1980s, fine and fee issuance swelled to become the punishment
tool of choice for low-level offenders 6 (Harris et al., 2010). This increased reliance upon fines
and fees for low-level offenses is consistent with the “broken windows” theory of crime
(Atkinson, 2015). Under this theory, an unrepaired broken window may signal that “no one
cares” possibly leading to more broken windows and serious crime (Kelling & Wilson, 1982,
March, para. 11). As such, under the broken windows theory, even minor crimes threaten
communities and, as such, warrant a punitive response from the criminal justice system (Kelling

5

Fines and fees are relied upon by almost every governmental unit imaginable and may originate in a variety of
actors, including courts, jails, probation, and government contracted treatment providers (Martin et al., 2018).
According to the Federal Reserve, six percent of adults owe court costs or legal fees. This figure rises to twenty
percent for those with an incarcerated immediate family member (Federal Reserve, 2020).

6

3

& Wilson, 1982, March). Parenti (2000) links the broken windows theory preoccupation with
order to the state’s need to socially control the apparent dysfunction driving many minor crimes.
Throughout the 1980s and beyond, minor crimes are generally not overlooked as law
enforcement across the nation became increasingly intolerant of all levels of crime, making
unprecedented arrests often leading to fines and fees for defendants (Atkinson, 2015). 7 While the
1980s adoption of broken window policies may hold some explanatory power for increased fine
and fee issuance, the portrayal of Blacks as a threat to society as proxy for menacing criminality
may also help explain American enthusiasm for increased application of punitive fine and fee
policies. Alexander (2010) recounts:
The Reagan administration hired staff to publicize the emergence of crack cocaine in
1985 as part of a strategic effort to build public and legislative support for the war. The
media campaign was an extraordinary success. Almost overnight, the media was
saturated with images of Black ‘crack whores,’ ‘crack dealers,’ and ‘crack babies’ –
images that seemed to confirm the worst racial stereotypes about impoverished innercity residents. The media bonanza that surrounded the ‘new demon drug’ helped to
catapult the War on Drugs from an ambitious federal policy to an actual war.
(Alexander, 2010, p. 5) 8.
The aforementioned successful media campaign accelerated after President Bush’s primetime
address during which he displayed a baggie of crack cocaine referring to it as the greatest

Wacquant (2006) claims “tough on crime” policies is subtext for being tough on Blacks because the “reigning
public image of a criminal” is of a “black monster” personifying an “explosive mix of moral degeneracy and
mayhem” (p. 56).
7

8

During this era, concern over crack cocaine took on racial and class overtones:
Public discourse focused on addiction and violence but the subtext was understood as that of race. Crack
cocaine was perceived as a drug of the Black inner-city urban poor, while powder cocaine, with its higher
costs, was a drug of wealthy whites . . . . This framing of the drug in class and race-based terms provides
important context when evaluating legislative response (Sklansky, 1995, p. 1284).

4

domestic threat facing the nation. President Bush promised America’s coming escalation of the
War on Drugs. A morally panicked mainstream America quickly fell in line (Reinarman, 1994).
Polling figures substantiate the success of this effort. In 1985, Americans were asked to identify
“the most important problem facing this country today.” Less than 1 percent considered drugs
the most important problem (Reinarman & Levine, 1997, p. 51). By 1989, 64 percent of
Americans identified drugs as the most important problem facing the nation (p. 51). The criminal
justice system responded accordingly. In 1985, 16,600 Blacks were incarcerated in state prisons
for drug offenses (The Sentencing Project, 1998, pp. 13-14). Ten years later, 134,000 Blacks
were incarcerated in state prisons for drug offenses. (p. 14). While mainstream America came to
embrace the War on Drugs, the stated goals of the architects of the War on Drugs appear to have
less to do with drugs and more with checking threats posed by a) Blacks fighting for civil rights
and b) a protesting counterculture threatening the American way of life. This point is made in an
excerpted piece on John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s former domestic policy advisor:
‘You want to know what this was really all about?’ [Ehrlichman] asked with the
bluntness of a man who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had little
left to protect. ‘The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had
two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the
public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their
leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on
the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.’
(CNN, 2016, March 24).

5

Given the focus of this research, it is notable the War on Drugs is allegedly inspired by
the perceived threat certain groups posed. Although drug use pervades relatively equally among
socioeconomic and racial lines, minorities and the poor represent a grossly disproportionate
number of drug arrests as well as the fines and fees attendant with drug arrests 9. While increased
reliance on fines and fees ushered in more government revenue and theoretically assisted in
combatting crime, this reliance also led to problems.
If fines and fees are unpaid, it is argued, citizens risk additional fines and fees, arrest
warrants, and imprisonment (Harris, 2016). Once fined, many remain saddled with cumbersome,
if not permanent, legal debt and turn fugitive (Goffman, 2009). In many cases, poverty, not
public safety, determine who remains under state surveillance and control (Harris, 2016). In
addition to economic status, race may also play a role in whether a particular community relies
upon fines and fees. Pine Lawn, Missouri, for example, is 96 percent Black with a per capita
income of $13,000. Yet, Pine Lawn generated $1.7 million in fines and fees (Atkinson, 2015, p.
197). In contrast, a neighboring community, Chesterfield, Missouri, is 86 percent White, five
times as populous, has a per capita income of $50,000 per year but only generated $1.2 million in
fines and fees (Atkinson, 2015, p. 197). While local governments vary in terms of fine and fee
issuance, overall, increased fines and fees are a growing pattern in America (Shapiro, 2014, May
19, para. 54; Council of Economic Advisers, Dec. 2015, p. 2; Federal Reserve, 2020; Shannon et
al., 2020).
Statement of Problem

One report estimates 9.5 percent of Whites and 10.5 percent of Blacks report using illicit drugs in the past month.
Yet, drug-related arrest per 100,000 residents of each race indicate 332 of every 100,000 Whites were arrested in
2013 for drug-related offense. By contrast, 879 of 100,000 Blacks residents are arrested in 2013 for drug-related
offense (Lopez, 2015),

9

6

Racial disparities occur in fine and fee issuance (Sances & Young You, 2017). While
existing research analyzes associations between fine and fee issuance, race, and socioeconomic
status, additional research is needed, on the county level, to explore associations between fine
and fee issuance, race, and socioeconomic status. Extant research enhances awareness of
concerns associated with fines and fees, but this research is characterized as largely atheoretical
(Harris, 2017, p. 17; Sances & Young You, 2017, p. 1093). The atheoretical state of fine and fee
scholarship may be partly attributed to the fact that myriad efforts examining fines and fees are
authored by journalists, public advocacy groups, or lawyers. The lack of theory to rationalize
fine and fee phenomena may also be because, until recently, fines and fees mostly evaded
scholarly attention (Harris, 2017, p. 17). Moreover, empirical fine and fee studies typically
sample one or a few cities or counties (e.g.’s, Muñoz & Sapp, 2003; Ruback et al., 2004) or lean
qualitative (e.g., Shapiro, 2014, May 19).
Leading fine and fee researchers point to “substantial need” and “substantial room” for
empirical and theoretical characterization of fine and fee issuance (Harris, 2017, p. 17; Sances &
Young You, 2017, p. 1093). Accordingly, there is an unmet need to explore, identify, describe,
and analyze characteristics and associations involving fine and fee issuance. The purpose of this
study is to contribute to filling the gaps motivating these calls for additional analysis.
Purpose of Study
The primary purpose of this quantitative study is to better understand what factors may
associate with fine and fee issuance. In other words, this effort seeks to further characterize
counties relying heavily upon fines and fees. In the context of cities, a robustly positive
association was found for per capita Black population and fine and fee issuance (Sances &
Young You, 2017). This association represents an important contribution to what we know about

7

cities fining the most. One goal of this project is to explore if this association maintains in the
context of counties. Additionally, this project endeavors to explore the strength of the selected
theoretical explanation for predicted associations between race, socioeconomic status, and fine
and fee issuance. In addition to these curiosities, several motivating factors inspire this
dissertation.
Local governments are under considerable criticism for relying on fines and fees to
generate revenue (Garrett & Wagner, 2009; Makowsky & Stratmann, 2009; Department of
Justice, 2015; Rios, 2016, December 16). Research indicates fine and fee issuance is
significantly elevated in areas with high per capita Black populations (Sances & Young You,
2017). Yet, literature examining fine and fee issuance is in early development and does not
appear to examine county-level fine and fee issuance on a nationwide level. Conflict theory,
however, provides a template for nationwide studies analyzing criminal justice activities, such as
analyzing associations between race, socioeconomic status and criminal justice outcomes,
including arrests, police force size, and the death penalty (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; D’Alessio
et al., 2005). Conflict theory, described in depth below, suggests criminal justice penalties
enhance in areas with economic difficulties or certain large minority populations. This theory fits
this project well as the design of these studies is geared to accomplish the aspired goal of this
effort – a quantitative examination of criminal justice phenomena measuring the interplay of race
and socioeconomic status.
The proposed method analyzes variables thought to measure determinants of fine and fee
issuance of the most populous American counties. A multivariate regression model to
characterize the associations between fine and fee issuance, race, and socioeconomic

8

disadvantage is selected. The handful of variables utilized in this project enables rich theoretical
and empirical engagement with all variables, assisting characterization of fine and fee issuance.
Research Question
The research question is: What, if any, association is there between race, socioeconomic
disadvantage, and county fine and fee issuance?
Per capita county level fine and fee issuance is the dependent variable and measured by
“fines and fees issued” of counties as reported to the U.S. Census Bureau. Other variables
include “Black population” and “Hispanic or Latino(a) population 10” of a county and a host of
socioeconomic variables to assist examining whether the association between fines and fees and
counties is marked by socioeconomic disadvantage. The U.S. Census is the original source of all
variables. In line with similar research contextualized in cities, most variables selected are
previously hypothesized to influence fine and fee activity (Sances & Young You, 2017).
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses guide this study:
H1: There is a positive association between fines and fees and race at the county level
H2: There is a positive association between fines and fees and socioeconomic
disadvantage at the county level
This project promises several contributions to the literature and beyond.
Contributions of the Study
Fines and fees are the most imposed form of social control (Harris, 2017; Martin, et al.,
2018). As such, topics covered in this study associate with significant controversies of our time,

Weitzer (2014) characterizes Hispanic threat literature as “thin and deficient” (p. 1998). In fact, the majority of
studies measuring racial threat lump Blacks and Hispanics together as a unified measured of racial threat or
overlooked Hispanics altogether (Eitle & Taylor, 2008).
10

9

such as race, inequality, and the criminal justice system. More specifically, there are scholarly
calls for social science research addressing fines and fees (Harris et al., 2010, pp. 1759-1760;
Harris, 2017, p. 18). Scholars invite research on fines and fees, and this study aims to
characterize the association between county fine and fee issuance and variables that may be
determinants of it. Enhanced awareness of characterizations relating to county fine and fee
issuance more than supplements scholarly knowledge on the subject; it provides possible
practical information to policymakers, journalists, advocates, and others interested in fines and
fees. Identifying associations thought to associate with county fine and fee issuance provides a
resource for recognizing jurisdictions prime for study, reform, protest, or litigation. Moreover,
future researchers may use this information to generate research questions, challenge findings,
update it longitudinally, or expand it latitudinally. Additionally, characterization of associations
assists in detecting levels of uniformity, degree, and differentiation, and helps us understand how
society operates. Also, examination of fine and fee issuance illuminates the impact of controlling
state power, especially as it relates to race as well as socioeconomic disadvantage. The
contributions of this study may extend beyond fine and fee scholarly circles.
In addition to contributing to fine and fee scholarship, literature associated with
independent variables and related theory may also benefit. One independent variable is Black
population in a county. We know this variable associates with municipal fine and fee issuance
(Sances & Young You, 2017). It is unclear, however, whether this finding extends to county fine
and fee issuance. Sances and Young You (2017) assert the implication of associations between
size of Black population and fine and fee issuance awaits deeper exploration. If fine and fee
issuance associates with racial composition of county, another instance of racial disparity in the
criminal justice system is documented by this effort.

10

Definitions of Terms (in alphabetical order)
Conflict theory: A sociological/criminological theory suggesting policies tend to reflect
preferences of those with the power to make policy (Vold, 1958). Scholars variously consider a
wealthy elite, pluralist forces or government actors as influencing policy (Turk, 1969; Quinney,
1970; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). Paradigmatically, conflict theorists conceptualize
exploitation, conflicting interests and variances in power as the essence of politics and society
(Greenberg et al., 1985). When conflict theory applies to criminology, some refer to conflict
theory as “conflict criminology” (Bernard, 1981) or “critical criminology” (Lynch, 2016).
Moreover, conflict theory is often used as general term for an expansive and developing body of
scholarship sharing the essential aforementioned themes. In this project, there are a number of
theoretical approaches drawn upon. Conflict theory relates to the racial threat theory suggesting
racial composition of place associates with criminal justice outcomes because certain minorities
are viewed as threats to the status quo and, in turn, in need of social control.
Moreover, some scholars featured in this project are influenced by or identify as critical
race theorists. Critical race theory originated in the 1970s as critical legal studies from scholars
arguing much of our legal code, knowingly or unknowingly, seeks to serve the status quo
(Turley, 1987). By the 1980s, much of critical legal theory was adopted and expanded upon by
critical race theory which increased in popularity and criticism since its inception. In the context
of criminal law, critical race and critical legal theorists highlight the pervasiveness of often
unintended but hurtful racial discrepancies in the criminal justice system, a system, it is argued,
which cannot be understood unless race and history related thereto serves as a central focus
(Crenshaw, et al., 1995).

11

Additionally, this project also draws upon conflict-related theorists emphasizing social
control theory which describes and analyzes how deviant behavior is defined and responded to
(Black, 1983). One aspect of social control is the use of criminal laws to punish undesirable
behaviors or persons (Fuller, 1975). For centuries, scholars argued the state must use laws, as a
social control mechanism, to combat a selfish human nature and the concomitant proclivity to
threaten others (Hobbes, 1957). It is argued these social control mechanisms often
disproportionately apply to those in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas (Vold, 2002).
For purposes of this project, the aforementioned theories are referred to collectively as conflict
theory or conflict-related theory.
Fee: A payment made to a government for a service. This may include court costs and/or
surcharges (Harris et al., 2010, p. 236).
Fine: A sum imposed for offenses against the state (Harris et al., 2010, p. 236).
Fines and fees: A general term for fines and fees incurred as a result of legal violations. Code
U30 of the Census of Government Survey Form of the U.S. Census employed in this project as a
measurement of “fines and fees issued” by a county. The text of Code U30:
Revenue from penalties imposed for violations of law; civil penalties (e.g., for violating
court orders); court fees if levied upon conviction of a crime or violation; court-ordered
restitutions to crime victims where government actually collects the monies; and forfeits
of deposits held for performance guarantees or against loss or damage (such as forfeited
bail and collateral) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011a).
Code U30 covers penalties related to matters of law but excludes “penalties relating to tax
delinquency; library fines; and sale of confiscated property” (United States Census Bureau,
2011a). It should be stressed that Code U30 includes fines and fees associated with fines for

12

“civil penalties (e.g., for violating court orders).” It is unfortunate some civil fines are included
in this category because the focus of this project is on criminal rather than civil violations of law,
such as failure to adhere to a court order for child support for visitation. Nonetheless, traffic
tickets are generally civil fines, although a few states classify traffic offenses as criminal
offenses, such as Georgia, Missouri, and Texas (Friedman et al. 2020). Fine and fee researchers
suggest traffic offenses are a worthwhile subject to study. For example, in California, Singla, et
al. (2020) found racial composition of a city is the leading predictor of the frequency with which
a city issues traffic fines. Claims that traffic violations are often based on race are particularly
noteworthy upon consideration of the extent of traffic violations in the United States; one
analysis finds more than 730 municipalities rely on fines and fees over 10 percent of its revenue
(McIntire & Keller, 2021). Some refer to fines and fees as “monetary sanctions” or “legal
financial obligations.”
Socioeconomic Disadvantage: A descriptive term indicating low levels of income, education.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
One assumption is the independent variables significantly and positively associate with
the dependent variable. Regression analysis checks this assumption. Other assumptions are also
methodological in nature and discussed in the Methodology section. Limitations are
acknowledged too.
As with most quantitative studies, there is a possibility of an omitted variable bias. One
key variable likely omitted is a direct measure of local government fiscal well-being, a variable
thought to relate to fine and fee issuance (Shapiro, 2014, May 19; Semuels, 2016, July 5; Shaw,
2016, September 26). This omission may be outside researcher control. The fiscal health of
governments is frequently a topic of contentious debate as budgets often lack transparency
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(Davis, Baxandall, & Pierannunzi, 2013). In spite of decades of efforts, scholars fail to cohere to
a measurement of local budgetary health (Gorina & Maher, 2016). The availability of transparent
government budgets is uneven at best (Davis, et al., 2013). Perhaps for this reason, the free
market often relies on bond ratings measuring local fiscal health. Yet, the reliability of these
ratings is questionable (Sinclair, 2005; Collins, 2014). Bluntly, former Representative Henry
Waxman exclaimed after credit rating companies failed to forecast the Great Recession: “The
story of the credit-rating agencies is the story of a colossal failure” (Paley, 2008, October 23, p.
A1). While this limitation orbits beyond researcher control, delimitations tie to methodological
concerns and are discussed in the Methodology section.
Framework
Conflict theory is the theoretical lens of this study. This theory is an appropriate fit with
the methodological plan as numerous conflict scholars employ research designs and variables
similar to the research design and variables for this project (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Kent & Jacobs,
2004; Choe, 2008). This research is discussed in the Literature Review. Not only does this theory
mesh well with the methodology for this project, this theory assists with rationalizing the
findings.
While extant literature appears to overlook application of this theory to fine and fee
issuance, scholars urge research evaluating fines and fees in connection with theoretical
perspectives (Harris, 2017, p. 17; Sances & Young You, 2017, p. 1093). At present, fine and fee
research is overwhelmingly, almost exclusively, atheoretical (Harris, 2017, p. 17). While conflict
theory is not as prominent as in the past, 11 this theory remains centrally featured in several

It may be fairly argued that the central tenets of these theories are more popular and controversial than ever.
Conflict theory shares the belief of proponents of critical race theory that the criminal justice system serves to
maintain the dominance of Whites at the expense of other races. In the course of completing this dissertation, critical
race theory morphed from a theory relatively unknown outside of academic orbits to a theory widely recognized as
11

14

textbooks as a leading explanation for criminal justice phenomena (Einstadter & Henry,
2006; Vito et al., 2006; Fitchburg, 2019).
Conflict theory is an extension of a theoretical tradition reaching back to Marx’s focus
on the causes and consequences of class conflict (Vito et al., 2006). These consequences include
a society where some are disproportionately advantaged or disadvantaged (Kent & Jacobs,
2004). In conflict theory, laws tend to reflect unequal arrangements of power (Kent & Jacobs,
2004). When resources are especially limited and uneven, the criminal law serves to safeguard
the interests of the dominant group(s) (Collins, 2009). This theoretical lens stands in sharp
contrast to conventional consensus theorists who view laws as the embodiment of a social
structure designed to protect all except those deviating from widely agreed-upon notions of
acceptable social behavior (Cohn, et al., 1991). Conflict theorists variously consider a wealthy
elite, pluralist forces or government actors as the primary influencers of policy (Turk, 1969;
Quinney, 1970; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971).
In the view of conflict theorists, the law is a tool often used to maintain elite control over
the system (Turk, 1969; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Jacobs, 1979; Williams & Drake, 1980).
As such, conflict theorists expect those relatively disadvantaged socioeconomically to be
disproportionately negatively impacted by criminal justice policies (Turk, 1969; Chambliss &
Seidman, 1971; Taylor et al., 1973; Jacobs, 1979; Williams & Drake, 1980). This hypothesized
disproportionately negative impact of criminal law on disadvantaged populations is evaluated by
testing associations between criminal justice activity, such as arrest rates or private police force
presence, and social science variables representing socioeconomic disadvantage or race (Jacobs
& Helms, 1999 Liska & Yu, 1992; Crawford, 2000; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Jacobs &
having explanatory power for social justice controversies and, seemingly concomitantly, a theory many in America,
including state and federal leaders, consider offensive and inappropriate to teach.
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Kleban, 2003; Kent & Jacobs, 2004; D’Alessio et al., 2005 Johnson et al., 2008; Caravelis et al.,
2011; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011). A substantially similar evaluation is applied in this
dissertation by testing fine and fee issuance with independent variables serving as proxy for race
or socioeconomic disadvantage.
In the context of cities, political scientists find fine and fee issuance positively associate
with the percentage of Black city residents (Sances & Young You, 2017). This finding might
partly support variants of conflict theory which suggest racial composition of place predicts
measures of social control (Snyder, 2013). In other words, where there is a high presence of
certain minorities, criminal justice systems tend to be more punitive as certain minorities are
often perceived as threats to the status quo and public safety (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Weitzer
& Tuch, 2006).
Additionally, this project seeks to examine the association between fine and fee issuance
and relative socioeconomic disadvantage of a county. It is thought that social control
mechanisms, such as fines and fees, increase in areas disadvantaged socioeconomically (Vold,
2002). It is claimed most conflict theorists concur that distributions of crime rates “will tend to
be the inverse of the distribution of social and economic power in that society” (p. 242).
Similarly, Jacobs (1979) argues: “The more there are inequalities in the distribution of economic
power and economic resources, the more one can expect that the social control apparatus of the
state will conform to the preferences” of the advantaged (p. 914). In Jacobs view, a “logical
implication” of inequality “is that an unequal distribution of economic resources will give elites
both the ability to control the coercive apparatus of the state and a vital need to maintain order so
that ongoing relationships can be sustained” (pp. 922-23). Others concur with Jacobs, contending
inequality of wealth not only renders the wealthy more able to maintain a criminal justice system
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preferred by them, it increases the need for this control. Chambliss and Seidman (1971) make
this point:
the more economically stratified a society becomes the more it becomes necessary for
dominant groups in society to enforce through coercion the norms of conduct
which guarantee their supremacy (p. 33).
Scholars suggest the rights of the disadvantaged are systematically violated and diminished in
the criminal justice system. Along these lines, Smith et al. (1984) argue unequal criminal justice
outcomes are less a racial problem and more of a socioeconomic one; discriminatory arrest
patterns may largely be explained by socioeconomic status. Westley (1970) found law
enforcement often consider those with low socioeconomic status, inherently criminal and, as
such, deserving of punitive treatment. The following figure illustrates how conflict theory is
hypothesized to apply to fine and fee issuance
Figure 1
An illustration of conflict theory framework as it is expected to apply to fine and fee issuance

High per capita
minority
population or
socioeconomic
disadvantage

Increased social
control

Increased fines
and fees

Note. Representation of conflict theory as it expected to apply to fine and fee issuance. Under
this theory, high concentrations of politically powerless minorities or the socioeconomically
disadvantaged represent a perceived threat to the system and predict measures of social control
(Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Vito et al., 2006).
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Conclusion
Fines and fees are a growing trend in America, yet the literature appears to largely
overlook county-level fine and fee issuance. It is unclear whether counties with significant
minority populations or socioeconomic disadvantage rely comparatively heavily on fines and
fees. In Chapter Two, a literature review is presented.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
This chapter covers the background, approaches, focuses, applications, criticisms,
findings, and methodological issues associated with variables selected for this study. First, the
dependent variable, fines and fees, is examined. Addressed in the examination are the need for
additional research and rationales for as well as against government reliance upon fines and fees.
I present a review of appeals for fine and fee reform, offering a novel characterization of
rationales for these reforms by situating studies in terms of the paramount rationale cited as
indicating need for reform which are equity, efficiency, and legality. Complimenting this novel
characterization of rationales supportive of fine and fee reform is an original review of the
rationales supportive of the status quo of fine and fee issuance`, to wit, funding, politics, and
notions of accountability. Also included within this examination is an exploitation of the fine and
fee practices of Ferguson, Missouri. This section offers the reader a sense of the political
pressure to issue fines and fees as well as unintended consequences thereof. This chapter then
shifts from practical to theoretical.
For each area, where practical, is a chronological analysis spanning from early histories
and writings to the latest scholarship. All areas organize thematically and, where applicable,
assess according to the scholarly conversation, relationships between studies, gaps in research,
significant findings, criticisms, and unsolved research questions.
Fine and Fee Overview (The dependent variable)
Fine and fee research is an up and coming area of scholarship marked by varied and
severe criticisms of the status quo, splits of opinion as to the characteristics of areas fining
substantially more than others and calls for further scholarly research. Despite the expansion of
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fines and fees over the last generation, fine and fee scholarship historically suffers from
dormancy (Levine, 2007, p. 193) with few notable exceptions. Martin (2020) appears to offer the
most comprehensive fine and fee literature review, chronicling the attention this topic receives in
the fields of applied research, economics, criminology, legal studies, political
science, public policy, social philosophy, and sociology. Perhaps the earliest work tangentially
touching on fines and fees is the seminal conflict theorist work by Rusche and Kirchheimer
(1939) who argue modes of criminal punishment are social phenomena influenced by economic
drivers. It is explained, criminal penalties in the Middle Ages were often marked by torture and
brandings but the penalties changed with the advent of capitalistic societies which prefer to use
criminals as sources of labor and revenue, such as fines. Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) work
received scant attention until the 1960s when economists and conflict theorists focused attention
on punishments, including fines and fees.
As Martin (2020) illuminates, in the 1960s, scholarly work in the field of economics and
political economy began to address fines and fees, e.g., Becker (1968). This line of literature
tends to address fines and fees with a cost-benefit approach, often concerning the economic
benefits of fining over incarceration while also taking into account the attendant costs of crime to
society and punishment to the individual. Among the contributions and claims from this
literature is that fines are considered relatively harmless to society (Becker, 1968) and whether
fine amounts should be tied to wealth (Friedman, 1981; Posner 1985). By the 1980s and,
especially, the 1990s, fine and fee use had grown and, along with it, the literature on the topic.
Criminologist and applied researchers began to investigate fines and fees during the
1980s. Much of this work is practical in nature, focusing on the efficacy of courts to collect fines
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and fees as well as evidence on whether fines and fees should be the punishment of choice (e.g.,
Morris & Tonry, 1991).
While fines and fees may be historically understudied, there is a sharp, recent uptick in
this nascent line of scholarship (McLean & Thompson, 2007; Anderson, 2009; Harris et al.,
2010; Pleggenkuhle, 2012; Kohler-Hausmann, 2014; Birckhead, 2015; Katzenstein & Waller,
2015; Sobol, 2016; Sances & Young You, 2017; Martin, et al., 2018; Friedman & Pattillo, 2019;
Cadigan & Kirk, 2020; Goldstein et al., 2020; Martin, 2020; Shannon et al., 2020; Singla, et al.,
2020). This uptick dovetails with increasing reliance upon fines and fees (Shapiro, 2014, May
19, para. 54). These efforts are fairly characterized as highly critical of current fine and fee
practices.
Criticisms implicate issues of equity (Beckett & Harris, 2011, p. 519), legality (Utah v.
Strieff, 2016, p. 9), and efficiency (Bannon et al., 2010, p. 25). Related to these criticisms are
accusations fine and fee systems are regressive and oppressive (Ruback & Bergstrom, 2006;
Anderson, 2009; Harris, & Beckett, 2010; Harris et al., 2010; Vallas & Patel, 2012; Eisen, 2014;
Atkinson, 2015; Council of Economic Advisers, 2015). Much of the recent research on fines and
fees is sociological in nature. As such, these studies often extend beyond the mechanics of fine
and fee issuance and investigate forces underpinning fines and fees as well as inquiries into how
fines and fees affect individuals, families, and communities. Overwhelmingly, the status quo of
fine and fee issuance is characterized negatively. Yet, governments increasingly rely upon fine
and fees, suggesting an expansive gulf between the literature and government practice.
The literature generally overlooks characteristics of jurisdictions fining more than others.
The slim work on this subject divide on whether heavy reliance upon fines and fees is primarily
an economic or racial problem. Some mention race as one of or the most prominent characteristic
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of areas fining most (Harris et al., 2011; Laisne et al., 2017; Sances & Young You, 2017; Singla,
et al., 2020). By contrast, others suggest economic conditions may be the most prominent
characteristic of areas fining most (Bannon et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2010; Shapiro, 2014, May
19; Semuels, 2016, July 5; Shaw, 2016, September 26). In either case, a significant number of
these studies, however helpful, are non-peer-reviewed efforts by attorneys, legal advocacy
organizations or journalists. As such, scholars call for novel social science research exploring
characteristics of local governments relying most heavily on fines and fees (Harris et al., 2010;
Harris, 2017). This call for research is prompted by the fact few researchers attempt to capture
why some jurisdictions fine more than others. This gap is especially pronounced in the context of
counties. Another gap in the literature is the scarcity of work which efforts meaningfully to
report on the rationales for fine and fees. I attempt to address these gaps and also to contribute to
closing the gap on fine and fee research generally.
The Need for Additional Research
Leading fine and fee researchers Harris et al. (2010) call for additional research to assess
the magnitude and scope of fine and fees (p. 1793) as “little is known about the frequency with
which monetary sanctions are actually imposed across the United States” (pp. 1759-1760). While
fines and fees deserve more scholarly attention, a few studies are on point.
Nationwide empirical studies of fines and fees are almost non-existent. Most of the few
studies published point to racial disparities and indicate nearly universal growth in fine and fee
issuance. The nationwide, peer-reviewed study most closely approximating the goals of this
research is an examination of over 9,000 municipalities using U.S. Census Bureau data and other
sources. This study reveals fine and fee levels among cities split unevenly, and robustly relate to
the percentage of Black city residents (Sances & Young You, 2017). Also, among the findings,
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cities with high Black populations fine approximately 20 dollars more per capita on average than
cities with the smallest per capita Black populations. The association between race and fines and
fees was significantly mitigated by the presence of Black city council members. Sances & Young
You also found percent of city revenue from fines, per capita income and population density
robustly associate with municipal per capita fines and fees issued. Per capita income and
population density most strongly predicted high fine and fee issuance. In contrast to this study,
however, Sances & Young You did not study counties.
More contemporarily and also featuring Sances and Young You as part of the research
team, Goldstein et al. (2020) investigate whether fine and fee collection efforts compromise
criminal investigations by municipal law enforcement, finding municipal police forces relying
heavily on fines and fees solve violent crimes at substantially lower rates than cities which do not
rely as heavily on fines and fees. The authors attribute this finding to pressure placed on local
criminal justice actors to devote significant time to issue fines and fees. 12 This finding
corroborates extant scholarship suggesting fine and fee issuance expansion in recent years.
Perhaps, the most comprehensive nationwide study of fines and fees is a non-peerreviewed collaboration authored by National Public Radio, NYU's Brennan Center for Justice
and the National Center for State Courts. Survey data from all states on the fees reveals 48 states
increased court fees since 2010 (Shapiro, 2014, May 19, para. 54). While not a central focus of
the study, the authors indicate budget shortfalls are a characteristic of those jurisdictions fining
most. Studies limited to one or a few states and cities are often problematic.

Such reasoning is consistent with extant studies indicating the War on Drugs shifts resources from solving violent
crimes to cracking down on drug crimes. In 1958, clearance rates for homicides stood at 93.5%, and, for violent
crimes, 78 percent (Duke, 2010, p. 6). By 2007, the clearance rates dipped to 61.2% for homicide, and, for all
violent crime, percent (p. 6).
12
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There exist many opportunities throughout the criminal justice system to incur fines and
fees and it is difficult to account for each instance a citizen may incur a fine or fee. It is even
more challenging to determine whether a given justice system may exercise discretion in the
collection of fines and fees from indigents. Even more complicated is comparison of
jurisdictional laws and practices as they lack uniformity on paper and, especially, in application
(Institute for Justice, April 30, 2020). Fines and fees may be mandatory or at the discretion of a
judge. For example, in California or Illinois, a judge is obligated to impose statutorily set fines
and fees. In contrast, judges in states such as Washington and Texas enjoy discretion when
assessing certain fines and fees (Harris et al., 2017). Studies with greater breadth than a single
jurisdiction generally point to uneven levels of fines and fees across jurisdictions. It appears
those studies most successful measuring fine and fee level on the municipal level employed U.S.
Census figures which allows for discovery of fine and figures. Those studies measuring statelevel fine and fee practices also sometimes use U.S. Census figures. These studies, however, tend
to acknowledge that statewide fine and fee levels (which do not take into account differences in
municipal or county-level fine and fee policies) may not shed a realistic light on those areas
relying most heavily upon fines and fees. A state with an overall low level of fining may be
home to cities or counties fining heavily.
In a forthcoming series of studies, Harris et al. (2017) lead a team of researchers at nine
universities in an exploration of the role of fines and fees in the criminal justice system. The
preliminary findings of this multi-part, nine-state study indicate: “There is an extreme amount of
variation – both between states and within states – on how, when and where monetary sanctions
are imposed by court officials. It’s a mess, and there are few guidelines and no national
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framework governing the use of monetary sanctions” (Harris et al., 2017). 13 While the Harrisled, multi-part study will take years to conclude, part of the research team published findings
from a review of law and policy in California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, Texas, and Washington states. Importantly, this study illustrates the difficulty of
relying upon state statutes and fee structures when measuring fine and fee practices:
Formal statutes and rules governing legal financial obligations may not adequately
represent how they are imposed and enforced through the daily activities of policing
agencies, courts, or supervisory agencies. Stipulated statutes and fee schedules
frequently provide allowances for discretion in their imposition and enforcement. More
attention must be paid to how the law is practiced and how legal financial obligations
are interpreted by those who impose and enforce them (Harris et al., 2017, p.4).
Many studies focus less on the amounts of fines and fees issued and more on who is impacted by
fines and fees. Sub-national studies tend to focus on race. While several indicate fines and fees
disproportionately impact minorities (e.g., Bannon et al., 2010; Singla, et al., 2020), existent
studies are mixed as to whether minorities are more likely to incur more financially substantial
fines and fees than similarly situated Whites in the criminal justice system. While several lament
fines and fees disproportionately burden minorities (Beckett et al., 2008; Bannon et al., 2010;
Harris, 2017; Sances & Young You, 2017), existing studies mix on whether minorities are more
likely to incur financially substantial fines and fees than similarly situated Whites.
On the one hand, a study tracking five Nebraska counties revealed White’s received 20
percent higher fines than non-white defendants (Muñoz & Sapp, 2003). Moreover, a

Martin, et al. (2018) similarly observe the absence or lack of uniform and detailed measures of fines and fees
renders it difficult to capture the prevalence and amounts of fines and fees issued as does Ruback (2004), and
Shannon et al. (2020).
13
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Pennsylvania study found race and ethnicity less important in terms of the amount of fines and
fees issued than the type of offense under consideration (Ruback et al., 2004). On the other hand,
a study of New Orleans’ fine and fee practices relied upon agency financial reports and justice
agency administrative records. These materials were used, among other purposes, to measure
revenue generated from fines and fees as well as the impact of fine and fees. Key findings
include fines and fees disproportionately impact Black communities (Laisne et al., 2017, p. 34)
and “black defendants were issued an arrest warrant in relation to unpaid fines and fees at higher
rates than white defendants” (p. 43). Beckett et al. (2008), employing regression analysis on fine
and fees in Washington State, found Hispanics incurred significantly higher fees than other
groups (p. 2).
These findings relate to earlier Washington State findings suggesting race and
demographic context significantly influence allocation of fines and fees (Harris et al., 2001).
Further south, arrest warrants for unsatisfied fines and fees were more likely issued for New
Orleans’ Blacks than Whites (Laisne et al., 2017). The authors presumed this influence flowed
from racialized stereotypes triggering punitive emotions (p. 235). 14 While observing economic
conditions are often cited as the driving force for increasing reliance upon fines and fees, Singla,
et al. (2020) found California cities reliance on fines and fees does not appear to associate with
budgetary need, but rather racial composition of a city is the leading determinant of the
frequency with which a city issues traffic fines. One issue revealed in the literature is a
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Harris considers fine and fee outcomes consistent with symbolic reactions long observed:
Socio-cultural perspectives on punishment suggest that official sanctions for criminal wrong-doing are
never solely about crime control but are inherently expressive and symbolic. Indeed, theorists ranging from
Durkheim (1984) to Mead (1918) to Garfinkel (1956) to Goffman (1956) emphasize the emotional and
morally expressive dimension of penal rituals and the role of emotions in the judgment, condemnation, and
punishment of criminal offenders (Harris et al., 2001, p. 237).
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significant percentage of fine and fee studies orbit outside academia. These studies often seek to
describe the experiences of those unable to pay fines and fees.
Accounts of individuals owing substantial fines and fees are common. Saturating these
portrayals are chronicles of hardships experienced by sometimes flawed, but invariably
sympathetic folks endearingly struggling against improbable odds to meet fine and fee payments
and, in turn, escape the often-familiar, sticky net of incarceration (Levine, 2007, p. 191; Beckett
et al., 2008, p. 40; Goffman, 2009, p. 339; Beckett et al., 2010, p. 16; Beckett & Harris, 2011, p.
525; Pleggenkuhle, 2012, p. 62; Vallas & Patel, 2012, p. 131; Atkinson, 2015, p. 204; Birckhead,
2015, p. 1601; Katzenstein & Waller, 2015, p. 639; Harris, 2016, p. 1; Sobol, 2016, p. 515;
Laisne et al., 2017, p. 13). These vignettes effectively underscore the human toll fine and fee
practices sometimes exact, portraying those saddled with outstanding fines and fees as
unfortunate citizens targeted by a clueless, hard-hearted justice system capable of reaching into
nearly every crevice of modern life, yet lacking the judgment and ethics to refrain from
threatening vulnerable citizens with uncollectable arrears. A representative example of these
vignettes is:
David Ramirez struggled to cope with the fallout from criminal-justice debt that he had
incurred a decade earlier. In 2003, David pled guilty to a single count of residential
burglary after entering the home of his ex-wife without her permission. The court ordered
him to pay $2,144 in restitution and over $1,147 in penalties and costs. At the time he
was earning only $10 per hour, and was also required to pay $500 a month in child
support. A couple of years later, because of medical problems and a lax economy, David
lost his job and was receiving public assistance when he missed a court-ordered payment,
and a warrant was issued for his arrest. To have the warrant lifted, David had to pay the

27

full amount owed plus an additional $100 “warrant fee” for a total of $800.25. Unable to
afford counsel, David lived in fear of arrest for a year until a lawyer from his church
helped him negotiate a lower payment; after borrowing money, he was finally able to
have the warrant lifted. Since then, David has resumed a reasonable payment plan and
has not missed a payment, but it has not been easy. He supports his four children, and the
family relies on $400 a month in public assistance and food stamps. David often must
choose between paying his fines and meeting his family’s needs, such as paying the
utility bills or buying winter coats for his children. His current debt balance of $1,839 is
composed solely of interest, which continues to accrue and will take him another five
years to pay off. He described his situation in stark terms: ‘The message the courts have
sent to me over and over again is that if I don’t pay in full every month, I’ll go to jail and
I’ll lose everything. I’ve had judges tell me that they don’t care what my other obligations
are [because] LFOs [legal financial obligations] come first: first before food and shelter.
It doesn’t matter what the family suffers, so long as the court gets paid’ (Birckhead, 2015,
pp. 1601-1602).
Such stories are often cited in connection to proposed fine and fee reform; a subject often
featured in non-peer-reviewed efforts.
As observed by Harris (2016), journalists and public interest law organizations assumed a
leading role in shedding light upon fine and fee practices. While such contributions are
substantial, Harris points to a need for social scientists to examine fines and fees with scholarly
rigor. Nonetheless, while not peer-reviewed, several efforts by journalists and public interest
groups represent “much of what we do know” about fines and fees (p. 6). Examples of
journalistic and public interest efforts to study fine and fee practices of cities, counties or states
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are DeVore (2016, October 26); Kopf (2016) and Shaw (2016, September 26). These and other
similar efforts tend to focus on a distinct set of concerns involving the elevated use of fines and
fees. These criticisms implicate issues of equity, efficiency, and legality.
Equity
To many, the fine and fee process is unfair. While scholars attribute various factors
leading to the assessment that the fine and fee process is unfair, concerns with a) structural or
institutional racism, and b) impact on the poor, represent the chief concerns associated with the
process (e.g., Shapiro, 2014, March 19).
Kopf (2016) reviewed the U.S. Census’s Survey of Local and State Finances and
concluded that “the use of fines as a source of revenue is not a socioeconomic problem, but a
racial one.” This conclusion is arrived to upon consideration that those cities relying most
heavily on fines as revenue are those cities with the most Blacks per capita. While some scholars
focus on the unfairness of the disparate impact of fines and fees on minorities, the foremost
concern of most scholars is the unfairness of asking for increased fines from those unable to pay
such fines without considerable difficulty, if at all.
Several argue fine and fee processes are unfair to the poor but identify disparate reasons.
The leading critique of fines and fees may be their regressive nature (e.g., Spohn & Holleran,
2000; Ruback & Bergstrom, 2006; Levingtson & Turetsky, 2007; Rosenthal & Weissman, 2007;
Anderson, 2009; O’Malley, 2009; ACLU, 2010; Harris, & Beckett, 2010; Harris, et al., 2010;
Vallas & Patel, 2012; Eisen, 2014; Evans, 2014; Shapiro, 2014; Evans, 2014; Atkinson, 2015;
Pishko, 2015). As regressive instruments, fines and fees disproportionately impact poorer
defendants. The poorer the defendant, the more punishment a fine exacts. Similarly, the poorer
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the defendant, the larger the percentage of their income is devoted to paying their share of the
cost to maintain the justice system (Friedman & Pattillo, 2019).
Other commentators focus on the unfairness of underfunding local governments to the
point where governments seemingly must turn to fine and fees for revenue. In the view of
Schwartztol, Executive Director of Harvard University's Criminal Justice Policy program: "One
thing that has been revealed over and over again in the Ferguson investigation and these lawsuits
is that the worst practices tend to arise when courts and other officials perceive a financial
necessity in funding their operation through fees and fines” (Rios, 2016, December 16). Some
find local governments face a “conflict of interest” in having to choose between funding their
justice systems and aggressively tapping into their own citizens as a source of revenue (Tobin,
1996; Conference of State Court Administrators, 2003; ABA Commission on State Court
Funding, 2004). Other commentators find it inequitable for governments to enlist private debt
collection agencies which are enriched at the expense of the poor (Bannon et al., 2010, p. 1). The
United States Supreme Court refers to the automatic practice of forcing someone to remain on
probation when a good faith effort to pay their fine and fees fails to satisfy their debts as
“fundamentally unfair” (Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69, 1983). Others find it unfair
that some states do not meaningfully consider whether a defendant will be able to pay their fine
and fees (Beckett & Harris, 2011, p. 509). In addition to concerns with unfairness, fine and fees
have and continue to face efficiency related criticisms as some portray the process as inefficient,
even counterproductive.
Efficiency
For myriad reasons, fines and fees are criticized as inefficient, even counterproductive
(Brooke-Eisen & Menendez, 2019, Nov. 21). The Brennan Center for Justice has, perhaps, drew
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the starkest conclusions on fines and fees as a fiscal policy. It charged that fines and fees are
“penny-wise and pound-foolish” 15 (Bannon et al., 2010, p. 25). Others find looming fines and
fees debt inspires some to reoffend and, in turn, return to incarceration (American Civil Liberties
Union, 2010; Bannon et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2010; Beckett & Harris, 2011, p. 518) or to
simply flee the jurisdiction (Goffman, 2009). Moreover, several jurisdictions report difficulties in
collecting fines and fees. In Florida, for example, for felony fees, the collection rate in 2013 was
below 14 percent (Murphy, 2015, p. 4). As another example, this time from Maryland, in 2006
and 2007, the collection rate of fees associated with parole was just 17 percent (Diller et al.,
2009, p. 2). Moreover, over a three-year period in Washington State, in a considerable majority
of cases, only 20 percent of fines and fees were collected and in half of the felony cases,
Washington was unable to collect anything (Beckett et al, 2008, p. 20). In some jurisdictions,
those who do not pay their fines and fees are arrested and incarcerated. In 2008, in Rhode Island,
2,446 individuals were jailed for outstanding fines and fees averaging $505.00. In 13 percent of
these cases, the cost of incarceration was greater than the debt owed (Murphy, 2015, p. 4).
Interestingly, states may be unaware that the pursuit of fines and fees may be fiscally
counterproductive. Diller et al. (2010) surveyed 15 states and found no formal process to track
costs associated with fines and fees (p. 10). Given few, if any, states collect data in this area, the
literature fails to provide a nationwide, comprehensive account of whether fines and fees are
inefficient and, if so, to what extent. In addition to concerns over the efficiency of fines and fees,
legal questions persist.
Legality

The Brennan Center for Justice, unfortunately, fails to fully substantiate this claim. As its only evidence that fines
and fees are cost ineffective, it points to a non-peer-reviewed North Carolina study which showed, in one North
Carolina County, expenditures to collect fines and fees and arrest those who failed to pay them, outpaced revenue
generated from collection of fines and fees (p. 26).
15
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On the heels of the first state fine and fee statutes, some commentators raised doubts as to
whether fines and fees are constitutional (University of Michigan, 1969; Bos & Livaudais, 1971).
Through the years, myriad legal battles have been waged over the imposition of criminal justice
fines and fees. In general, fine and fee laws have been upheld, with courts being fairly
unsympathetic to lawsuits charging violations of the Excessive Fine and Equal Protection
Clauses until recently. 16 While the Courts have generally been generally unresponsive to legal
challenges to fines and fees, the Obama Administration pushed to reconfigure the fines and fees
process.
[former] Attorney General Loretta Lynch issued a warning to municipal
and state judges across the country that their courts could lose federal funding
if they do not ease up on fines and arrest warrants for minor crimes involving
poor offenders, indigent minorities in particular.
In lieu of fines and jail time, Lynch urged the nation’s 6,500 municipal
courts to provide an avenue for offenders to perform ‘community service’ or
take advantage of ‘amnesty days,’ whereby outstanding arrest warrants are
cleared for nominal fees. Failure to comply with these policies could trigger a
Ferguson-style discrimination investigation 17. Already, Lynch says she’s
In the landmark case, Timbs v. Indiana (2019), the Court held the Excessive Fines Clause in the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states and not just the federal government. By so holding, state-level defendants are now
provided with a defense previously unavailable to those who owe fines and fees a court may consider excessive.
17
With regard to the mention of Ferguson, as a matter of context, it should be noted that as part of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department, the DOJ charged:
“Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety
needs,” and that using fines to fund the government undermined “law enforcement legitimacy among African
Americans in particular” (p. 15). “Ferguson uses its police department in large part as a collection agency for its
municipal court” (Department of Justice, 2015, March 4, p. 55). The DOJ further found:
16

The large number of municipal court warrants being issued, many of which lead to arrest, raises
significant due process and equal protection concerns. In particular, Ferguson’s practice of automatically
treating a missed payment as a failure to appear—thus triggering an arrest warrant and possible
incarceration—is directly at odds with well-established law that prohibits ‘punishing a person for his
poverty’ (p. 57).
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‘evaluating discrimination complaints against several court systems’ (Sperry,
2016, March 27).
In addition to the former Attorney General of the United States, a Supreme Court justice recently
addressed fines and fees, warning fines and fees serve as a common pretext to stops diminishing
the rights of citizens and the justice system.
In Utah v. Strieff (2016), the Court held evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an
outstanding warrant does not have to be suppressed even if the warrant was discovered during an
unlawful investigatory stop. In essence, this case stands for the proposition that if a police officer
illegally stops a person, but later finds an outstanding warrant for the stopped individual, that
person can be arrested and searched, and the evidence procured from that search may be used to
prosecute. Notably, many outstanding warrants are for outstanding fines and fees. Justice
Sotomayor dissented vigorously to the majority opinion insofar as it is characterized the illegal
stop in Strieff as “isolated,” with “no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic
or recurrent police misconduct.” In the words of Justice Sotomayor:
Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When a person with a traffic ticket
misses a fine payment or court appearance, a court will issue a warrant. When a person
on probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a court will issue a warrant. The States
and Federal Government maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants,
the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.
Even these sources may not track the ‘staggering’ numbers of warrants, ‘drawers
and drawers’ full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and ordinance infractions.
The county in this case has had a ‘backlog’ of such warrants. The Department of Justice
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recently reported that in the town of Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of 21,000,
16,000 people had outstanding warrants against them.
Justice Department investigations across the country have illustrated how these
astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause.
In a single year in New Orleans, officers ‘made nearly 60,000 arrests, of which about
20,000 were of people with outstanding traffic or misdemeanor warrants from
neighboring parishes for such infractions as unpaid tickets. In the St. Louis metropolitan
area, officers ‘routinely’ stop people—on the street, at bus stops, or even in court—for
no reason other than ‘an officer’s desire to check whether the subject had a municipal
arrest warrant pending.’ In Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,235 pedestrians
within a 4-year period and ran warrant checks on 39,308 of them. The Justice
Department analyzed these warrant-checked stops and reported that ‘approximately 93
percent of the stops would have been considered unsupported by articulated reasonable
suspicion’ (pp. 7-9) (internal citations omitted).
Justice Sotomayor concludes her dissent with language unlike any previous language from a
Supreme Court Justice:
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are
‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal,
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize
that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until
their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but (p. 12)
(internal citations omitted).
Given the above concerns, it is unsurprising fines and fees are increasingly challenged in the
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judicial system. Harris et al. (2017) report the grounds upon which fines and fees are judicially
challenged typically implicate cases where an indigent fails to pay fines and fees and, in turn, is
assessed with more fines and fees, and even imprisonment.
As mentioned, the United States Supreme Court has long held that imprisonment when
there is a good faith failure (i.e., a demonstrated inability) to pay outstanding fines and fees is an
unconstitutional violation of the due process clause (Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69,
1983). Yet, subsequent state court decisions often appear at odds with Bearden. As an example,
in Minnesota, an indigent defendant failed to pay for a residential sex offender program required
as part of his probation sentence. In turn, the defendant’s probation was revoked, and his prison
sentence reinstated. The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged the unfairness of returning
an indigent to incarceration for a failure to pay a fee but held this unfairness was outweighed by
Minnesota’s interest in funding sex offender programs (State v. Morrow, 1992).
In general, states side-step application of Bearden by offering a meaningful determination
of whether an indigent is able to pay before revoking probation for failing to pay a fine or fee,
e.g., Washington v. Stone (2012). Not all states, however, require financial vetting of defendant’s
ability to pay at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, in many states, those failing to make timely
fine and fee payments become the target of arrest warrants. The Supreme Court of Idaho,
however, in a precedent-making decision, ruled it unconstitutional to issue arrest warrants for
unpaid fines and fees in cases where defendants are unable to pay or when the government fails
to make an adequate inquiry as to whether a defendant is able to satisfy her fines and fees (Beck
v. Elmore County, 2021). Months later, the Supreme Court of Washington State also held
courts must meaningfully determine the individual financial circumstances of the person being
fined (City of Seattle v. Steven Gregory Long, 2021). Despite the questionable legality of some
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fine and fee practices, for reasons of principle and purse, governments are increasingly reliant
upon fines and fees.
Defenses of Fines and Fees
A review of the literature supportive of the fine and fee status quo serves as a
contribution to the scholarly literature. Possibly without exception, existent literature offers a
critical review of fines and fees. In this literature, arguments in support of the fine and fee
process are briefly mentioned in passing, if at all. Yet, governments increasingly rely upon fines
and fees. This suggests an alarming gulf between the scholarly literature and governmental
practices. This literature review departs from others in terms of content and subject matter by
meaningfully recounting the limited, available defenses offered for the status quo of the fine and
fee process.
Mill (1859) cautioned: “He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that”
(p. 67). It is concerning that the study of fines and fees focuses on the problems with the fines
and fees process, oftentimes, to the exclusion of reasons why governments increasingly rely so
heavily upon fines and fees. Alternatively, when scholars do speculate why a governmental unit
may significantly rely upon fines and fees, the governmental actors are often characterized in a
completely negative light. For example, Harris (2020) relates the concept of “predation” was a
reoccurring theme during the Harvard 2019 convening, “Progressing Reform of Fees and Fines:
Towards A Research and Policy Agenda:”
Scholars over and over returned to rhetoric that framed the system of monetary
sanctions as a greedy and destructive set of practices, purposefully implemented by
state policymakers and reinforced by local justice actors (p. 2).
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While these characterizations may help advance understanding of the fine and fee status quo,
such absolute characterizations may overlook other, less-sinister, defensible, avenues to view
state actors and their rationales for fine and fee issuance. Accordingly, in the hope of procuring
some semblance of balance, the scant literature and other accounts supportive of the fine and fee
process is reviewed. This literature suggests funding, politics, and notions of accountability, are
the leading rationales offered in defense of fines and fees. 18
Funding
While criminal justice costs have generally accelerated nationwide in the past few
decades, financing for the criminal justice system has not kept pace (NCSC, 2012). For example,
from 1993 to 2012, total real annual criminal justice expenditures jumped by 74 percent (Council
of Economic Advisers, Dec. 2015, p. 2). During this period, state level criminal justice
expenditure growth increased by 69 percent and, local level criminal justice expenditure growth
increased by 61 percent (p. 2). In light of such figures, the American Bar Association declared a
nationwide crisis in state-funding of the judicial system. Moreover, Harris et al. (2017) report
several states rely upon fines and fees to fund expenditures on law enforcement such as trainings,
pensions, and operating costs. Fines and fees are one method to fund the criminal justice system
and, for several reasons, fines and fees are one of the most politically popular ways to fund the
criminal justice system. 19

Another, less cited, rationale for the use of fines and fees is that fines may serve as a deterrent to some activities,
such as traffic violation (e.g., Bar-Ilan & Sacerdote, 2004). The slim research in this area is mixed with some finding
a deterrent effect (Weisburd, et al., 2008) while others failing to find a deterrent effect (Waldfogel, 1995).
18

Harris et al. (2017) note in several states a wide variety of stakeholders benefit from fines and fees. For example,
in North Carolina, local departments of education are largely dependent on the revenue stream from the ‘improper
equipment fee’ that could be assessed for a variety of motor vehicle infractions and misdemeanors (p. 19). Other
beneficiaries of fines and fees in various states include but are not limited to domestic violence shelters, victim
assistance funds, brain and spinal injury funds, law enforcement training, local law libraries, indigent defense, and
jail and prison construction. In Louisiana, it is reported fines and fees earmarked for a judicial expense fund
financed supplemental insurance for two judges, leather upholstery for a take-home vehicle, two Ford Expeditions,
19
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Politics
Insistence upon poor people paying fines has been likened to “political grandstanding” as
such policies are popular with the public even if many defendants are unlikely to satisfy their
fines and fees (Silverman, 2004, May 1). Nonetheless, it is assumed that asking criminal
defendants to pay more is more politically popular than prevailing upon taxpayers to further
subsidize the criminal justice system. 20 While many Americans find the justice system is too
tough on crime, 41 percent find the justice system is "not tough enough" (Gallup, 2020,
November 16). 21 As such, to the extent policymakers are self-interested and chiefly concerned
with reelection, it is rational to increasingly rely on criminal defendants, and not the general
public, to fund the justice system. In addition to the public and elected officials, fines and fees
have also been supported, in several states, by the leadership in the public defender community.
Wright and Logan (2006) observe leaders of the public defender communities, in several states,
supported new fines and fees when the alternative policy is a reduction in public defender
funding (p. 2060). More generally, the public historically supports fines and fees in comparison
to other modes of punishment (Cohen et al., 2002). Many of the few existing published
comments on fines and fees from public officials point to the need to keep criminal defendants
accountable with fines and fees.
as well as a private chef (Brooke-Eisen & Menendez, 2019, Nov. 21). In 2019, it is estimated state and local
governments collected $16 billion in fines and fees (Boddupalli & Mucciolo, 2022).
Walsh (2018) urges a close examination of any reference to taxpayers, arguing, “the claim of ‘taxpayer’ almost
always has a hidden symbolic meaning premised in whiteness and has served as a currency of exclusion and
inequality” (p. 4).
20

Whether the justice system is “tough enough” is a topic for which the public has oscillated for years, possibly
because the criminal justice system is often perceived to overcorrect. While it is clear social justice issues are in the
forefront of public discussion, reforms may prove ephemeral. For example, merely one out of five respondents
believe law enforcement treats everyone equally. In the same poll, however, crime was listed as the number one
concern of Americans, a vast majority of which support increased police budgets and foot patrols (Page & Lee,
2021, July 8).
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Accountability
Eisen (2014) collects a few examples of attitudes toward fines and fees. One Iowa sheriff
opined, “if they are violating the law, then they should be the ones to pay for it.” Moreover, an
elected official in California charged: “You do the crime, you will serve the time, and now you
will also pay the dime.” A judge in Washington State focused even more closely on the problem,
noting that imprisonment for failure to pay fines and fees seems to be the only arrows in the
judiciary’s quiver. In his words: “If they won't pay the money, the only thing we can take from
them at that point is their time” (Shapiro, 2014, May 19). In the view of some court
administrators, criminal defendants are customers using a service and, like anyone else, they
should pay for that service. As one court administrator put it, criminal defendants “don't
necessarily see themselves as a customer because, obviously, they’re not choosing to be there.
But in reality, they are” (Shapiro, 2014). A leading scholar in this area, Ruback (2014), identifies
four advantages of fines and fees over incarceration and probation.
First, fines and fees are understandable. From ancient times to the modern civil litigation
system, citizens are expected to pay after unlawfully injuring another or the state. The second
advantage is more of a potential advantage versus incarceration and probation. In theory, and in
the practice of a few jurisdictions, fines and fees may be tailored to calibrate equitable
punishments. With the appropriate sliding scale laws in place, judges could have the discretion to
impose substantial fines and fees upon the wealthy and less substantial, but just as punitive, fines
and fees upon the poor.
Third, fines and fees may serve as sources of restitution for crime victims and society;
most states offer victim restitution funds which draw upon fines and fees for funding.
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Finally, some consider fines and fees superior to incarceration and probation because it
offers punishment calibrated to the appropriate level. In the era of mass incarceration, there is an
elevated need for intermediate sanctions less severe than imprisonment, but more punitive than
probation. On the one hand, probation officers are often overwhelmed with the sheer number of
probationers to be supervised. As such, many probationers rarely meet with their probation
officers and do not consider probation much of a punishment. In sharp contrast, incarceration is
widely considered quite punitive as it often disrupts family life as well as physical, mental and
economic health (p. 1780). While it may seem fair for criminal defendants to pay their criminal
justice debts, several reforms have been proposed to lessen burdensome fines and fees. While
some state actors double down on fine and fee issuance, others propose reform.
Proposed Reforms
In late 2016, the Justice Department filed over a dozen lawsuits against local
governments over fines and fees and additional concerns. Previous to these actions, the Justice
Department settled several cases. Terms from the settlement of these cases provide plausible
policy changes, including: eliminating cash bail for nonviolent offenses, dismissing failure to
appear charges, forgiving fees, offering sliding scales for fines and fees, avoiding use of civil
debt collectors, refraining from issuing warrants, immediately releasing people on first arrest on
bond, providing alternatives to debt repayment, such as payment plans, job training programs,
mental-health counseling, creating small scale alternative monthly payments, providing credit for
community service, and requiring judges to ask about a person's ability to pay at hearings (Rios,
2016, December 16). Other suggested reforms include creating an impact analysis of existing
and proposed fees to determine social and financial costs and generated (or expected) generated
revenue; exceptions for indigents; a policy to lessen or remove late fees and other consequences
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of a failure to pay (e.g.’s, driver license revocation or even a loss of voting rights), and a policy
to cease state supervision/incarceration for those who remain in the system simply because of an
inability to pay fine and fees (Patel & Philip, 2012, p. 3).While space does not permit a
comprehensive accounting of all proposed fine and fees reforms, several share reforms produced
by their research, e.g., Vallas & Patel, 2012; Shapiro, 2014.
Typically, reformers call for more thoughtful, flexible, and forgiving fine and fee policies
(Department of Justice, 2016, March 27). Key features of most reforms include proactive
safeguards preventing the application of fine and fees to those with doubtful ability to pay. Other
reforms are more reactive, focusing less on preventing the creation of fine and fees and more on
ensuring that failures to pay do not lead to arrests (Vallas & Patel, 2012), continued state control
and surveillance in the form of probation. While criminal justice reformers are busy fashioning
reforms to lessen the impact of fines and fees, governments are enhancing efforts to collect fines
and fees.
Efforts to Collect Fines and Fees
In contrast to the above proposals, many jurisdictions double down on efforts to capture
fines and fees. South Dakota, for example, contracted with the Obligation Recovery Center to
vigorously collect fines and fees. 22 Other jurisdictions appear to focus more on preventing the
incursion of certain fines and fees, such as indigent counsel, in the first place.
In Waco, Texas, for example, Detective Carrizales serves as “indigent defense
investigator” (Butts, 2014, May 30). Within a few months of being named indigent defense
investigator, Carrizales was credited for “significantly” reducing requests for court appointed

Others find less elaborate mechanisms may successfully capture outstanding fines and fees. Lurigo and Davis
(1990) found those who received threatening letters were more likely to pay restitution orders than those who did
not receive a threatening letter.
22
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counsel in a county struggling to pay its public defenders. On a routine basis, Carrizales pays
house calls to selected defendants who applied for court-appointed counsel. If applicants are
caught lying on their forms, they are charged with a felony. It is reported: “Since Carrizales
began, people have refused court-appointed attorneys because they don’t want an officer coming
to their home.” While making his “house calls,” Carrizales arrested over 20 people for
outstanding warrants and other unspecified reasons. While some applicants do not want
Carrizales entering their homes, a captain at the local sheriff’s office notes “those with nothing to
hide welcome his investigations” (Butts, 2014, May 30). This example as well as the example of
Ferguson help illuminate why some advocate fine and fee reform. In fact, Martin (2020)
observes the events in Ferguson and investigations in response “helped ignite sustained interest”
in fines and fees among advocaats, legal professionals, and the scholarly community (p. 901).
Ferguson, Fines, and Fees
It is well-understood the primary motivation of some government actors sources in selfinterest. Conflict scholars argue the letter and application of criminal justice policy sometimes
primarily aims to maximize the power of the criminal justice system and minimize strains on it
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). Others similarly find bureaucrats often act primarily to maximize
budgets and job security (Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1965; Benson et al., 1995). The possibility of a
bureaucrat acting in self-interest is often plausible because criminal justice actors historically
enjoy wide decision-making latitude (Lipsky, 1980; Gerber & Hopkins, 2011; Sances & Young
You, 2017). The field of American Politics corroborates bureaucrats of all levels sometimes
wield broad discretion, noting the often-dominating power of bureaucracies over policy (Mills,
1956; Dye & Zeigler, 1972; Putnam, 1977). Therefore, it is unsurprising bureaucrats often
emphasize the role of budget manager over traditional bureaucratic functions (Niskanen, 1971).
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This blurring of bureaucratic role connects vividly to a Department of Justice investigative report
detailing the tightly managed fine and fee practices in Ferguson, Missouri (Department of
Justice, 2015, pp. 2-15).
A bureaucratically sensed need for fine and fee revenue foreshadowed the Ferguson riots.
In response to the Ferguson unrest, the Department of Justice investigated Ferguson’s justice
system (Department of Justice, 2015). A significant component of this investigation focused on
fines and fees. Investigative findings prompted alarm the Ferguson justice system concern for
revenue eclipsed concern for public safety or Constitutional principles (p. 2). In the view of the
Justice Department, Ferguson’s focus on revenue generation compromised the character of the
justice system.
The Justice Department report offers myriad accounts detailing fines and fees practices of
Ferguson as evidence of inequity. In the eyes of the Justice Department, the Ferguson court
system did “not act as a neutral arbiter of the law or a check on unlawful police conduct” (p. 3).
Instead, the Ferguson justice system prioritized revenue generation above traditional justice
system functions. Arrest warrants issued not out of concern for public safety, but rather as
perfunctory responses to missed fine payments. In 2013, Ferguson, population around 21,000,
issued 32,975 warrants largely for petty infractions, e.g., parking violations, traffic tickets, and
housing code violations (Robinson, 2015, May 13, para. 5). In isolation, most of these infractions
would not justify an arrest or incarceration. Yet, when fines and fees for these infractions went
unpaid, citizens found themselves incarcerated.
These incarcerations accompanied a policy failing to provide alternatives to payments,
such as community service (Department of Justice, 2015). Concerned, one city councilmember
implored city leaders to adopt alternatives to paying fines. In this councilmember’s view,
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community service alternatives “keep those people that simply don’t have the money to pay their
fines from constantly being arrested and going to jail, only to be released and do it all over
again” (pp. 3-4). This concern apparently went unaddressed as the Ferguson justice system
appeared steadfast in seeking revenue above other concerns.
Another Ferguson city councilmember wrote city officials, opposing reappointment of a
judge known for imposing significant fines. The councilmember claimed the judge “does not
listen to the testimony, does not review the reports or the criminal history of defendants, and
doesn’t let all the pertinent witnesses testify before rendering a verdict” (p. 15). As emails
intercepted by Justice Department officials reveal, the councilmember conceded “switching
judges would/could lead to loss of revenue,” but argued even if a switch in judges “lead to a
slight loss, I think it’s more important that cases are being handled properly and fairly” (p.15). In
response, the Ferguson city manager acknowledged concerns with the judge, but successfully
pushed for reappointment: “It goes without saying the City cannot afford to lose any efficiency
in our Courts, nor experience any decrease in our fines 23” (p. 15). In addition to judicial and local
bureaucratic efforts to escalate fine and fee issuance, law enforcement played the part of an
instrumental actor in fine and fee issuance policy execution.
Adding another layer to the problem, the Department of Justice alleges multiple levels of
the Ferguson local government experienced pressure to enhance fine and fee issuance. In one
instance, the city finance director warned the chief of police: “Unless ticket writing ramps up
significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next
year... Given that we are looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall, it’s not an insignificant issue”
(p. 10). Later, the police chief informed the finance director: “Municipal Court gross revenue for
The DOJ found the City of Ferguson used fines and fees to cover nearly 20 percent of Ferguson’s operating
expenses (Department of Justice, 2015, March 4, p. 55).
23
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calendar year 2012 passed the $2,000,000 mark for the first time in history, reaching
$2,066,050,” prompting the fiancé director to respond, “Awesome! Thanks!” (p. 10).
Another communication uncovered by the Justice Department is a threatening email sent
down the law enforcement chain of command by a patrol supervisor, promising to terminate
officers failing to issue an adequate number of fines. Such emails may explain why some officers
began competing with one another over who could issue the most fines (p. 11). This behavior
aligns with an extensive scholarship acknowledging law enforcement tendencies to follow orders
of bureaucrats overseeing the police (Silver, 1967; Wilson, 1968; Ostrom & Whitaker, 1973;
Williams, 1984b; Chaney & Saltzstein, 1998; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; McDevitt,
2008; May & Winter, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2020). Ultimately, after the Ferguson riots, the
Department of Justice fleetingly emerged as a powerful actor in the context of fine and fee policy
by forcing the city into a settlement agreement dictated by the far more muscular federal agency.
In the wake of the Ferguson riots, the Justice Department, helmed by Democrat Attorney
General Lynch, disseminated a guidance letter to all state and local courts threatening lawsuits or
loss of federal funding for abuse of fine and fee processes (Department of Justice, 2016, March
27). This threat soon transformed ephemeral. The Republican successor to Attorney General
Lynch possibly abdicated the newfound powerful role of the Justice Department in the context of
local fine and fee policy when rescinding Lynch’s fine and fee guidance letter without
specifically identifying the reason for doing so (Shortell & Schneider, 2017, December 22).
Predictably, fine and fee reformers howled at the withdrawal of the guidance letter, alleging fines
and fees are part of a “perverse, profit-based framework that helps spin the revolving door of the
criminal justice system” (Shortell & Schneider, 2017, December 22). This alleged profit-based
framework may extend to include portions of corporate America.
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Fines and fees handed down in Ferguson may relate to corporate welfare (Atkinson,
2015). Allegedly, the city of Ferguson primarily preyed upon its poorest to finance its operations
because it was short in revenue after awarding too many tax incentives to affluent companies,
including the extremely profitable Fortune 500 company, Emerson Electric (Johnson, 2015,
April 26). In one year, Emerson Electric pulled in $24 billion, an ample sum to satisfy the
$68,000 a year it paid Ferguson for property taxes on its 152-acre corporate headquarters
(Atkinson, 2015, p. 196).
Also, of interest, the county where Ferguson sits, St. Louis County, had an above average
rate of income inequality at the time law enforcement clashed with protestors on the streets of
Ferguson (Gandel, 2014, August 15, para. 7). It bears mention that corporate welfare often
exacerbates socioeconomic disadvantage (Reich, 2015).
How Socioeconomic Disadvantage May Relate to Fine and Fee Issuance
Some doubt consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage are capturable (Mankiw, 2013;
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015). The consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage are complex
and difficult to empirically demonstrate (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015). The debate over
socioeconomic disadvantage implicates empirical and moral claims (Jencks, 2002). Since
empirical claims are difficult to assess, there is an emphasis on moral arguments (Jencks, 2002).
Nonetheless, some contend, the most frequent arguments assailing the impact of socioeconomic
disadvantage predicate upon the consequences socioeconomic disadvantage arguably has
(Jencks, 2002). If these moral arguments are not empirically supported, some claim efforts to
label heightened socioeconomic disadvantage as immoral warrant dismissal (p. 50).
Yet, an enormously influential work convinces others the impact of socioeconomic
disadvantage looms forebodingly. Standing on centuries of worldwide data, Piketty (2013)
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argues the conventionally accepted Kuznets (1955) curve is inaccurate. Kuznets curve indicates
economic inequality subsides when industrialized countries mature. In contrast to this
perspective, Piketty explains past depressions or stagnations in income inequality as the product
of illusory gains made possible by wars, labor unions, and other advancements. Piketty points to
contemporary accelerations of income inequality. This growth, driven by accumulations of
wealth expanding faster than the economy, depresses economic growth and may ultimately lead
to a full-fledged plutocracy. Others paint an even bleaker picture, forecasting a dystopia
featuring a plutocracy profiting by leveraging those weighing low on equality scale to a point
marked by extreme financial, psychological and physical suffering (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).
A 2014 report from a leading financial research firm indirectly indicates how expansive
fine and fee activities of American counties may relate to socioeconomic disadvantage.
Employing regression to Gini coefficients, the authors claim income inequality thwarts economic
growth as the affluent are more likely to save while the poor are more likely to spend (Standard
and Poor, 2014, August 5, para. 47). This slowdown in economic growth results in governments
searching for novel revenue sources to alleviate budget problems (Cingano, 2014). Nobel
laureate Stiglitz (2012) draws a similar conclusion, arguing growing economic inequality
hampers growth and leads to economic instability.
One frequent product of economic instability is revenue shortfalls, a factor highlighted
numerously in fine and fee literature as a prominent characteristic of areas fining most (Shapiro,
2014, May 19; Semuels, 2016, July 5; Shaw, 2016, September 26).
Some find local governments face strong and conflicting interests, having to choose
between funding justice systems and aggressively tapping into citizens for revenue (Tobin, 1996;
Conference of State Court Administrators, 2003). This pressure on local government actors to
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generate revenue is perhaps traceable to effects of income inequality, an allegedly significant
contributor to the Great Recession (Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012; Palley, 2013). This recession
forced local governments to scale back on services, personnel, and projects (Lander & Kumodzi,
2015, April 28). In this context, increases in fine and fee issuance followed property tax declines
in St. Louis County (para. 11). These fines and fees punished relatively innocuous offenses
ranging from occupancy certificate violations for sleeping at the home of another or tickets for
failing to maintain residential lawns. Nearby cities were even more aggressive, one small city
fined a jaw-dropping $600 per capita annually (para. 11-12). That the socioeconomically
disadvantaged may bear much of the brunt of the Great Recession’s effects on the criminal
justice system would hardly surprise a conflict theorist.
Conflict Theory Background
At its broadest, conflict theory explains how social conflict shapes society (Vito et al.,
2006). This general body of scholarship has been passed down to contemporary conflict theorists
from several rich intellectual traditions. Essential concerns of conflict theory are alluded to, at
least, as early as Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics; Aristotle predicted economic inequality
might lead to group conflict. Helping architect early conflict theory was the observation of Sellin
(1938) that heterogeneous societies tend to result in dominant groups forming laws benefiting
them. Moreover, Marxist influences provide the essence of the broader sociological paradigm,
conflict theory. While conflict theory stands on the shoulders of myriad intellectual predecessors,
theory formation and acceptance remained elusive until the latter part of the 20th Century.
Vito et al. (2006) identify Vold (1958) as producing the first criminology textbook
meaningfully covering conflict perspectives. Vold, a conflict theorist, viewed policy as product
of conflict between self-interested normatively heterogeneous groups. While various groups
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reflect a wide variety of moral prisms and interests, it is those with the most power who
generally prevail in the political process. The successful group is able to define policy to suit
their purposes. In general, the successful group considers, non-White collar crime-control a
priority, especially in the face of threats to the status quo. By design or circumstance, this
emphasis on crime control may not play to the advantage of disadvantaged groups. At times,
those in power pass laws intending to stifle threatening populations, weaponizing the criminal
law against other groups competing for power.
While conflict theory applies to a variety of phenomena, this review generally limits to
the interplay of conflict theory, and criminal justice. As mentioned, early conflict theory centers
on one particular observation – societies tend to result in dominant groups forming laws to their
benefit (Sellin, 1938). Twenty years after this observation, Vold (1958) argued while various
groups reflect a wide variety of moral prisms and interests, those with most power prevail in the
political process. Vold and conflict theorists to follow believe successful groups in the policy
arena are willing and able to define policy to suit self-interest (Krisberg, 1975; Pepinsky, 2006).
In this way, conflict theory is antithetical to the conventional consensus theory of crime
suggesting government policies are manifestations of social consensus as to what constitutes
morality and best interests of all (Cohn et al., 1991). Fittingly, the subversive conflict theory
surfaced to prominence in a decade featuring a disobedient counterculture.
While conflict theory fell short of enjoying early prominence with American scholars, it
caught the eye of scholars in the midst of the turbulent 1960s. Approximately a decade after
Vold (1958) articulated conflict theory, scholars ignored it (Vito et al., 2006). Then, with the
Vietnam War and Civil Rights Movement serving as backdrop, conflict theory attracted her most
prominent advocates, Turk (1969), Quinney (1970), and Chambliss and Seidman (1971). These
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prominent early conflict theorists drew upon earlier scholarship covering similar themes
(Simmel, 1904; Bonger, 1916; Sellin, 1938; Coser, 1956; Mills, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1958;
Blalock, 1967).
Conflict theorists portray conflict as a clash among several groups but also acknowledge
the uneven power accorded to elite economic interests (Vold, 1958; Turk, 1969). Many conflict
theorists mention the apparent uneven application of the law to substantiate claims that the
affluent and politically powerful disproportionality influence policy formation (Taylor et al.,
1987). To substantiate this line of reasoning, conflict theorist often point out white collar
criminals face less punitive penalties than other criminals, even though white collar criminals
perpetrate crimes causing the greatest property loss and physical injuries (Chambliss & Seidman,
1971). This point follows Bonger’s (1916) observation that destructive actions of the rich (e.g.’s,
fraud and food adulteration) are often without criminal justice penalty, while small-time
criminals are frequently prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Moreover, conflict-oriented
scholars theorize the criminal justice is historically designed to control the disadvantaged and
protect the advantaged.
As noted by McDevitt (2008) and advanced by Silver (1966), the police may have a
“historical mandate” to control selected social groups. This observation is based in the historical
reality that policing services were originally required to safeguard the property of the
economically advantaged from the perceived threat of the economically disadvantaged. As Silver
puts it, the police were initially developed in order to protect property owners from the poor.
Along these lines, Blauner (1972) argues law enforcement serves to maintain the colonial status
of Black Americans by acting as "key agents in the power equation" and performing "the dirty
work for the larger system" (p. 99). Silver (1966) argues the police inherited this “dirty work”
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from the military. Before the police, law enforcement was carried out by the army or the
yeomanry, an irregular force of rural property owners. This arrangement, however, was
problematic as it was costly and difficult to dispatch the military with the immediacy needed
(Silver, 1966). In time, the police took over this dirty work of controlling the less fortunate
(Silver, 1966). This delegation of responsibility provided several advantages (Silver,1966). A
full-time police force was more responsive and insulated elites from the coercive actions of the
state (Silver, 1966). Silver argued contemporary law enforcement serve the same purposes.
Several scholars link law enforcement size with racial composition and economic status; police
force size appears to be the most popular dependent variable employed in conflict theory
scholarship.
Criticism of Conflict Theory
Criticisms of conflict theory are eclectic. Conflict theory comes under fire for epistemic
reasons. A leading criticism is the concept of “threat” invoked by a stream of conflict scholars is
often unclear (Liska, 1987). Skeptics question whether variables such as socioeconomic
inequality or racial composition amount to threats inspiring state response (Liska, 1987). Perhaps
in response to this criticism, later conflict researchers sometimes turn to survey instruments to
connect threats with indicator variables (Chiricos et al., 2004).
Given those engaging in conflict-related studies represent a wide array of perspective,
conflict theory comes under understandable criticism for a lack of uniformity and integration
between studies (Liska, 1987). Compounding this problem, conflict theorists create confusion by
sometimes failing to specify the stream of conflict theory utilized (Beirne, 1979).
Another critique of conflict theory is it should predict that the more politically powerful
gender experiences lower incarceration rates, yet this is clearly not the case (Vito et al., 2006).
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Along these lines, are dismissals of Marxist-oriented conflict theorists overlooking societal
consensus for much of the criminal law (Turk, 1969). The most withering criticisms of conflict
theory hinge upon bold and fuzzy claims that the economically powerful exclusively dominate
criminal justice systems.
Numerous conflict theorists hypothesize criminal justice systems conform to the
preferences of monied elites (Taylor et al., 1973; Quinney, 1974; Spitzer, 1975). Doubts cast on
the clarity of this supposed preference link to a lack of evidence substantiating claims of a
scheming elite economic class commandeering criminal justice systems (Greenberg et al.,
1985). 24 Even in the view of some conflict theorists, devotion to David-and-Goliath-like
accounts of social order appears too simplistic for a modern society bearing little resemblance to
vestiges of 19th-century power configurations still influencing some Marxist-oriented conflict
theorists (Turk, 1969). Along with accusations that Marxist-oriented conflict theorists were
moving east on a westbound train, several extend the focus of conflict theory to update a
literature commonly treating the middle class or government actors as outside its conception of a
powerful actor (Turk, 1969; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). Criticism of conflict studies includes
omitting measures of economic inequality without justifying the exclusion of such a key variable

As Brewer (2016) points out, the field of American Politics has made important contributions to much of what we
know about the central role of inequality in politics. For example, in Federalist #10, Madison argued that principle
aim of a new government was to control factions, noting: “The most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society” (Madison, p. 79). The role of class has been hotly debated by American politics
scholars over the years. Brewer notes Tocqueville (2000), Hartz (1954) and others downplay the role of inequality in
American politics, variously pointing to an America marked by egalitarianism, lack of feudal past and larger
concern for religion, region and race. Yet, a select few scholars offer important contributions highlighting the role of
class on American politics. In this vein, Key & Heard (1949) observed “politics generally comes down, over the
long run, to a conflict between those who have and those who have less” (p. 307). Along these lines, Schattschneider
(1960) warned of a strong upper class bias dominating politics in the absence of an engaged public and robust
political parties. More recently, Gilens (2012) observed, there is almost no relationship between lower- and middleclass preferences and policy outcomes when the upper class fails to share those preferences. In stark contrast, upper
class preferences significantly and positively relate to policy outcomes, regardless of whether such preferences enjoy
the support of lower and middle classes.
24
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(Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Liska et al., 1981; Greenberg et al., 1985). Additional concerns of the
scholarly community relate to conflict theory focused on race.
Some scholars extend the reach of conflict theory from Blacks to other generally
overlooked populations, such as immigrants or ethnic groups (e.g., Horowitz, 1985). As noted,
the typical measurement of racial threat has been per capita Black population. Recently,
however, others argue, for epistemic reasons, perception of threat should also be operationalized
by surveys. King and Wheelock (2007), as an example, examine how perceptions of minority
economic threat and population composition predict racialized punitive attitudes. To measure
perceptions, surveys were used to discover a positive association between economic threat level
perceived by Whites and their support for harsh criminal justice outcomes for Blacks. Turk
(1969) argued large minority populations are more likely to resist coercion and become
politically powerful, therefore, posing the greatest threat to elites. Yet, others argue multidimensional measures of perceived threat should be employed in addition to sheer size of
minority population, such as measures of racial inequality and black immigration patterns, e.g.,
Parker et al., (2005). Others have similarly argued disparate treatment of races should go beyond
racial composition and test for minority populations increasing in size, e.g., Caravelis, Chiricos
& Bales (2011). Some contend sheer size of a minority population may fail to capture perceived
group threat, instead suggesting that the more “visible” a minority group evokes fear of crime
(Liska, 1992). Others find the racial threat perceived by citizens is overstated and the role of the
federal government on local criminal justice spending should be considered more seriously, e.g.,
Vargas & McHarris (2017). In addition to focusing on perceptions, some scholars argue that
overlooked variables, such as proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border, must be considered when
measuring racial threat, e.g., Holmes et al. (2008). In contrast, others view racial threat is at its
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lowest when minorities are closely concentrated. It has been suggested that the more minorities
in an area, the less likely law enforcement will be to exercise social control. Under this line of
analyses, when minorities are heavily segregated, elites perceive less of a threat, therefore
leaving the criminal justice system likely to neglect areas of insignificant interest to the elites
(Blalock, 1967; Blau, 1977; Chamlin & Liska, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Liska & Chamlin, 1984;
Liska, 1992; Liska & Yu, 1992; Tolnay & Beck, 1992). While conflict theory scholarship has a
venerable history, it appears there is no nationwide study explicitly examining this theory in
connection with fine and fee practices of counties, although per capita Black population has been
found to predict fine and fee levels (Sances & Young You, 2017). Conflict oriented theorists,
however, have a long history examining the intersection of crime and socioeconomic
disadvantage.
Criminal Justice, Socioeconomic Disadvantage, and Empirical Studies
Existing scholarship offers several perspectives to ponder in connection with the
intersection of socioeconomic disadvantage and the criminal justice system. Empirical
scholarship covering criminal justice and socioeconomic disadvantage tends to converge at how
scholars consider various social, demographic or economic variables as proxies for concepts
thought to influence criminal activity or criminal justice outcomes (Williams & Drake, 1980;
Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Kent & Jacobs, 2004; D’Alessio et al., 2005). Yet divergences in approach
surface in this literature.
Extant research suggests socioeconomic disadvantage affects the criminal justice system
by inspiring criminal behavior (Blau & Blau, 1982) or by producing an economic, cultural or
racial threat prompting government response (Williams & Drake, 1980).
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Empirical studies of criminal justice and socioeconomic disadvantage commonly
demonstrate significantly positive associations. Less universal is the orientation of this research.
While such categorization may be novel, it appears criminal justice and socioeconomic
disadvantage literature may bifurcate into two main camps of empirical strategy. In one camp,
scholars focus on whether socioeconomic disadvantage leads to criminal activity. In the other
camp, scholars study whether socioeconomic disadvantage leads to more controlling criminal
justice outcomes.
Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Criminal Activity
In the criminal activity camp, several find robust associations between criminal activity
and socioeconomic disadvantage (Blau & Blau, 1982; Williams, 1984a; Liska, Chamlin, & Reed,
1985; Box, 1987; Kennedy, et al., 1998; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Choe, 2008). Notable in this line
of literature is a study of 76 cities indicating arrest rates positively associate with socioeconomic
disadvantage (Liska & Chamlin, 1984). More notable is a meta-analysis of 34 aggregate data
studies involving violent crime and socioeconomic disadvantage. These 34 studies reveal
socioeconomic disadvantage positively associates with violent crime (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993). In
addition to these findings, one study finds socioeconomic disadvantage significantly and
positively affects the incidence of crime worldwide (Fajnzylber et al., 2002, p. 25).
A significant percentage of studies connecting criminal justice activity and
socioeconomic disadvantage conceive that relative socioeconomic disadvantage inspires
humiliation, spawning a criminogenic environment (Blau & Blau, 1982). On the same track,
others argue social injustices result from socioeconomic disadvantage, leading to a rejection of
social norms and concomitant embrace of crime (Quinney, 1974). Some Marxist-oriented
scholars pin blame on capitalism, suggesting socioeconomic disadvantage leads to crime because
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capitalism and its attendant inequalities motivate criminal behavior. For instance, Bonger (1916)
describes a capitalist system encouraging rich and poor alike into criminal activity, viewing
crime as a natural consequence of the exploitation of the poor. Later, Quinney (1974) went so far
as to depict criminal activity as a natural protest against the ruling class. 25
Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Criminal Justice Outcomes
Other conflict theorists concentrate less on social factors influencing criminals, instead
orienting concern to state responses to populations, movements and conditions threatening power
shifts – especially power shifts threatening elite grip of the system (Turk, 1969; Chambliss &
Seidman, 1971; Jacobs, 1979; Williams & Drake, 1980). Although possibly unmentioned by
conflict theorists, the state response during reconstruction when Blacks began assuming a more
equal standing in society provides an example where conflict theory appears to offer
considerable explanatory power. As power shifted away from Southern elites, the state
responded by oppressing Blacks through the convict lease system and other repressive, yet legal,
measures (Balkin & Levinson, 2012).
The stream of conflict theory focusing on state response to groups, conditions, and
movements conclude criminal justice outcomes including law enforcement expenditures (Kent &
Jacobs, 2004), corrections expenditures (Jacobs & Helms, 1999), sentencing outcomes (Myers,
1987), law enforcement use of deadly force (Liska & Yu, 1992), private police presence
(D’Alessio et al., 2005), and the death penalty (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002) are often reactions
to threats in the social environment. In this line of analysis, certain minorities and economic

25
In contrast, Parenti (2000) dismisses arguments that “crimes” such as robbery, rape and murder are social protests.
Instead, Parenti (2000) claims crime and fear of it should be viewed as an integral part of state social-control
policies – crime and the fear of it provide the state with the opportunity to control society. Parenti identifies three
ways crime serves as social control, crime elicits fear, “absorbs bodies," and “energy” that might otherwise be
directed toward rebellion and pushes the poor and oppressed “into the arms of the state” (p. 44) by inspiring the
impoverished and people of color to support “tough on crime” policies (p. 47).
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conditions perceived as threats to a community trigger state response, e.g., enhanced law
enforcement presence in areas with heightened socioeconomic disadvantage (Kent & Jacobs,
2004). This stream of conflict theory scholars tends to explain positive linkages between criminal
justice activity and threatening populations as largely, but not exclusively, a function of topdown processes designed to protect and preserve the interests of the powerful (Turk, 1969;
Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Taylor et al., 1973; Jacobs, 1979; Williams & Drake, 1980).
Significant studies produced by this camp of researchers headlined by Jacobs focus on criminal
justice outcomes including the finding socioeconomic disadvantage influenced law enforcement
size in all nations surveyed (Kent & Jacobs, 2004). Also influential is an analysis of metropolitan
statistical areas where socioeconomic disadvantage successfully predicted law enforcement size
(Jacobs, 1979). Drawing upon data for 195 metropolitan areas and utilizing regression and a
cross-sectional design, an inverted U-shaped relationship between private police presence and
socioeconomic disadvantage formed (D’Alessio et al., 2005). In the context of arrests rates,
Williams & Drake (1980) cautiously suggest criminalization is a function of dominant and
subordinate power structures rather than a reflection of actual incidences of crime. In sharp
contrast to the above findings, others doubt the strength of socioeconomic disadvantage and
criminal justice relationships.
Turning conflict theory on its head, one study indicates percent poor associates
negatively with law enforcement expenditure (Jackson & Carroll, 1981). In opposition to studies
finding police force size and socioeconomic disadvantage positively associate, a few find no
such relationship (Dye, 1969; Foley, 1977).
Social Control, Power, Ideology, and the Historical Development of the United States
Criminal Justice System
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One aspect of conflict theory is the focus on social control as well as the concepts of
power, ideology, and the historical development of the United States criminal justice system.
Viewing fines and fees with this lens may offer additional explanatory power as to why fines and
fees appear to proliferate across the United States.
Contemporary efforts examining criminal justice phenomena often analyze the historical
roots of the criminal justice system along with the influences of social control, power, and
ideology. In this vein, Potter (2013) offers several observations which may help explain recent,
amplified reliance upon fines and fees. One observation is the influence of the neo-conservative
worldview on criminal justice policy. In Potter’s view, neo-conservative political philosophy
views humans as “animals” needing control lest civilization descend into chaos (para., 10). 26
Drury (2003) points to the German-American philosopher, Leo Strauss, as the primary
intellectual force behind neo-conservatism. Others have done so as well (Thompson & Brook,
2010). Strauss, Drury claims, taught that most citizens, if left uncontrolled, will squander their
liberty by committing crimes, using illicit substances, or making other unwise decisions. This is
similar to the 17th Century observation of Hobbes (1957) that humanity requires the strong
control of the state to counteract a selfish human nature. In this line of thinking, the need for state
control of the foolish masses takes precedence over liberty (Drury, 2003). As noted previously,
adherence to the broken windows theory required penalizing even minor infractions (Kelling &
Wilson, 1982, March). Parenti (2000) explains the broken windows theory penalized even minor
crimes in order to socially control those actions perceived to threaten social order, this is
especially the case with disadvantaged communities. Complimenting this line of scholarship,

Drury (2003) explains neo-conservative belief is strikingly different than paleo-conservativism. The former is
aggressive and reactionary to liberal developments in society. By contrast, traditional paleo-conservativism is
resistant to change and deferential to tradition.
26
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Wacquant (2006) explains that while neoconservative ideology adopted tough on crime policies
such as the broken windows theory, these policies are often embraced from across the political
spectrum.
One consequence of these tough on crime policies is that it further subjects individuals to
enhanced state control, especially the poor and people of color (Harris, 2016). The American
criminal justice system has a long history of laws, such as Jim Crow laws, Black Codes, the War
on Drugs, and tough on crime policies which disproportionality control the disadvantaged via
elevated arrest rates and uneven ability to defend themselves in the justice system (Harris, 2016).
As a result, people of color and low socioeconomic status experience asymmetrical punishments
which politically, economically and socially marginalize them. In this respect, Harris (2016)
finds fines and fees serve as another American iteration of social control. While fines and fees
may not control as effectively as prison, scholars studying other countries find the proliferation
of fines and fees widens the net of the criminal justice system (Duff, 1993).
One aspect of heightened social control through the criminal justice system is that it may
lead to even more enhanced social control (Fagan & Meares, 2008). It is claimed that punitive
criminal justice policy may result in “stigma erosion,” where the credibility of punishments is
lessened as punishments appear unfair and disproportionate (Fagan & Meares, 2008).
Dissatisfaction with the justice system, especially among those in disadvantaged communities,
may lead to cynicism and disobedience prompting intensified criminal justice controls (Fagan &
Meares, 2008). 27 Under this line of perspective, criminal justice outcomes may be partially
explained by the level of disadvantage in a community as the criminal justice system unevenly

Along these lines, a host of studies examine how fines and fees affect the reentry process (e.g., Beckett & Harris
2011; Pleggenkuhle, 2018; Link, 2019).
27
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punishes disadvantaged communities which, in turn, may inspire more crime (Fagan & Meares,
2008). Relating to this line of analysis is conflict theory focusing on race.
Per Capita Black Population
A line of literature indicates why per capita Black population may associate with fine and
fee issuance. This literature draws upon conflict theory focused on race as a framework. This
branch of conflict theory is also known as the “racial threat hypothesis” or “racial threat theory.”
In a foundational work, Blalock (1967) posits race heavily influences social organization. In
Blalock’s view, underlying social organizations are racialized competitions for control and
resources. As such, conflict theory premises that dominant groups carefully maintain control
over competitor races viewed as inferior, power-seeking and undeserving of dominant social
group privilege (Blalock, 1967). This line of conflict scholarship developed into what it
sometimes called the racial threat hypothesis (Dollar, 2014). Under this theory, the racial
composition of place relates to measures of social control (Dollar, 2014). The basis for this
relationship is that where there is a high per capita of relatively politically powerless minorities,
policies, and practices tend to be more punitive (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Weitzer & Tuch,
2006).
Conflict Theory and Race
While there is a scarcity of studies examining the impact of socioeconomic disadvantage
on criminal justice actions, there is a mountain of research linking criminal justice policy and an
outgrowth variant of conflict theory focusing on racial threat. Dollar (2014) explains “most
investigations of racial threat rely on the percent of relative minority population as the primary or
sole measure of threat.” In this project, per capita Black and Hispanic or Latino(a) population
serve as independent variables. A majority of the macro-social research drawing upon racially
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based conflict scholarship vis-à-vis governmental control mechanisms involve criminal justice
behavior and resources, e.g., police force size, and arrests. Dollar’s (2014) informative review of
this literature is heavily supplemented here.
Police Force Size and Race
Sever (2003) found only 5 percent of 28 empirical studies of conflict theory and police
force size failed to support conflict theory. These studies employed cross-sectional data (as does
this effort) (e.g., Jackson 1989; Jackson & Carroll, 1981), longitudinal designs (e.g., Liska & Yu,
1992) and controlled for such factors as economic inequality (e.g., Jacobs, 1979), city revenues
(e.g., Chamlin, 1990; Jackson, 1985; Stucky 2005), and residential segregation (e.g., Kent &
Jacobs, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2008). Several scholars link law enforcement size with racial
composition; in fact, police force size appears to be the most popular dependent variable
employed in racially focused conflict theory scholarship.
Examining interplay between race and law enforcement size, scholars, as with the present
effort, generally rely upon the racial composition of place. A less commonly used variable to
measure racial threat is racial segregation (Liska et al., 1985). Employing racial composition of
place, scholars find positive and significant relationships for allocated size of law enforcement
(Greenberg et al., 1985; Jackson & Carroll 1981; Jacobs, 1979; Liska, et al., 1981; Chamlin
1989). Among the many studies on point are Stults & Baumer (2007) who illustrated White’s
fear of crime and perceptions of racialized economic threat fairly equally predicted variation in
law enforcement size; Barkan and Cohn (2005) who observed racial prejudice and fear positively
associate with law enforcement expenditures; Huff and Stahura (1980) found per capita Black
population of suburban areas is a statistically significant predictor of the size of police force even
in areas with stable levels of violent and property crime, and Jackson and Carroll’s (1981)
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observation of 90 municipalities, which discovered per capita share of minorities positively
associates with policing expenditures. These researchers also revealed a significantly positive
link between law enforcement budgets and Civil Rights activity such as sit-ins, demonstrations
and boycotts (p. 300). Others suggest “racial threat” plays a unique role in American crime
policy. For example, Kent and Jacobs (2004) observe that out of 11 developed nations, the
United States is the only one with a significant relationship between minority populations and
police size. Conflict theory invoking race finds support in studies focusing on size and funding of
law enforcement and also in the context of arrest rates.
Arrest Rates and Race
Liska and Chamlin (1984) found size of non-White population in U.S. cities increased
arrests overall. Others have drawn similar conclusions, e.g., Mosher, 2001; Stolzenberg et al.,
2004. By contrast, Parker et al. (2005) concluded per capita Black population negatively
associates with arrest rates. This conclusion, however, did not take into account Black on Black
crime appears to pose far less of a social threat than Black on White crime. Eitle and D'Alessio
(2002) and others employed pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis indicating Black on
White crime positively associates with Black arrest levels.
Corrections and Race
Breunig and Ernst (2011) observe the greater the per capita Black population of a state,
the more funds allocate to corrections. Notably, Breunig and Ernst did not uncover any evidence
that “institutional and political factors, including partisanship, divided government, referendum,
and citizen ideology, influence the prioritization of corrections spending” (p. 243). Instead, it
was found “structural factors, specifically racial threat and inequality, are the dominant forces in
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determining the prioritization of corrections spending” (p. 243). Jacobs and Helms (1999) found
similarly.
Conclusion
The fiery Ferguson riots mobilized the federal government to chase a paper trail revealing
local government officials as the primary architects of fine and fee policy. Emails from these
officials reveal power to raise revenue vis-à-vis fines and fees in a city marked by heightened
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, and a large Black population. For decades, associations
between criminal justice activity and racial composition of place are well known to those
familiar with conflict theory scholarship. Yet, there has been little scholarship explicitly
examining the connection between conflict theory and fine and fee practices, although political
scientists found a link between racial composition of municipalities and fine and fee issuance
(Laisne et al., 2017; Sances & Young You, 2017). This project now turns to the regressions
conducted to determine whether the associations between racial composition of place,
socioeconomic disadvantage, and fine and fee issuance maintain in the context of counties.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
In this Chapter, the methodology employed to examine potential associations between per
capita fine and fee issuance of the most populous American counties with race, and
socioeconomic disadvantage is described. The quantitative multivariate linear regression design
is an appropriate means to accomplish research goals which include helping close research gaps
overlooking county-level fine and fee issuance and exploring possible associations between fines
and fees, race, and socioeconomic disadvantage. This chapter introduces the research design
including sampling considerations and data collection as well as an examination of the validity
thereof.
Research Design
The research question is: What, if any, association is there between race, socioeconomic
disadvantage, and county fine and fee issuance?
This question reflects the hypotheses for this project:
H1: There is a positive association between fines and fees and race at the county level
H2: There is a positive association between fines and fees and socioeconomic disadvantage at the
county level
To explore the research questions and hypotheses, multivariate linear regressions are
employed to examine if the independent variables significantly associate with the dependent
variable, county per capita fine and fee issuance. Three models are utilized. Model 1 measures
the association between county per capita fine and fine issuance and variables representing
socioeconomic disadvantage. The variables selected are proxy variables thought to measure
socioeconomic disadvantage in extant research (Goldstein et al., 2020). The second model
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measures the association between county per capita fine and fine issuance and variables
representing race, namely, the percent of a population which is Black and the percent of a
population which is Hispanic or Latino(a). The third and final model measures socioeconomic
and racial variables.
The empirical analysis of the three models draw upon data from five hundred counties
representing the most populous United States counties for which data is available 28. In the data
collection process, several counties were excluded from consideration because a county either
failed to report data for one or more of the variable categories or the data appear erroneous.
While the data is sourced in existent datasets, it took considerable effort to locate 500 counties
for which data is available for all variables and even more effort to assemble that data into one
novel dataset. In several instances, data for a county was collected for several variables but later
that county was expelled from the dataset after no reliable data relating to a particular variable
could not be located.
The dependent variable is county per capita issuance of fines and fees. Data for this
variable originates from the Census of Governments, a project of the United States Census
Bureau that reports revenue and expenditure data for local governments every five years. 29
Specifically, Code: U30 of the Census of Governments requires each locality to report fines and
fees relating to violations of law and excludes fees such as building permits or tax delinquencies
(Goldstein et al., 2020, p. 11). To obtain the fines and fees reported by a county, the unit file for
each county government must be downloaded and unzipped. Once the file is unzipped, an ID

28
There were a handful of counties which failed to respond to code U30 of the Census. In the context of
municipalities, Sances and Young You (2017) also reported a few units of government failing to respond to cODE
U30.
29

This data was retrieved from the Harvard Dataverse, a free repository for research data (Harvard Dataverse, 2017).
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number represents each county and a code represents each category in the Census of
Governments survey, including Code U30. In order to arrive at the per capita fines and fees
issued, the population of the counties is divided by the “fines and fees issued” of a county.
Initially, there was an attempt to measure fines and fees of a county as a percentage of the
total revenue for a county budget. This effort, however, was abandoned upon consideration of
the myriad complication attendant with tracing how fines and fees contribute to county revenue.
For example, in the context of speeding tickets, Boddupalli and Mucciolo (2022) explain that in
a majority of states, traffic ticket revenue is allocated to a variety of different levels of
government as well as to a variety of funds. Complicating matters further, the percent allocation
of a given fine or fee is non-uniform in nature among localities. Boddupalli and Mucciolo (2022)
further explain sometimes fees are transferred to a given level of government as a percentage of
the fine, but in other cases, a fine from one unit of government will transfer to another
government or fund as a bases amount irrespective of the fine amount, e.g., 12.50 of every Maine
is earmarked for a Court Technology Fund. Traffic fine allocation may also depend upon such
myriad factors as the classification of the road on which the fine was issued (local, state, or
interstate) and, sometimes, a given fine is designated for many funds, e.g., in Arkansas traffic
fines are ultimately divided and deposited into one of 21 funds, such as the Justice Building
Fund, Judges Retirement Fund, and Division of Arkansas State Police Fund (Boddupalli &
Mucciolo, 2022).
Moreover, there was concern that measuring fines and fees as a percent of revenue may
skew results as smaller localities tend to reply more heavily upon fine and fee revenue than
larger units of government. For example, in the context of municipalities, cities under 10,000
residents appear to take in three times as much revenue (as a percent of general revenue) from
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fines and fees than cities with over a million residents (Boddupalli & Mucciolo, 2022). Given
this concern along with the labyrinthine nature of fine and fee allocation, a research decision was
made to measure fines and fees in a relatively more straightforward manner, to wit, on a per
capita basis consistent with the approach of past research (Sances & Young You, 2016).
Data for the independent variables is sourced from one-year estimates from 2013
collected through The American Community Survey, also conducted by the United States
Census Bureau. Race is measured by the percent of a county’s population which is Black, or
Hispanic or Latino(a). Socioeconomic disadvantage is measured by a host of variables thought to
represent socioeconomic disadvantage (Goldstein et al., 2020). Independent variables utilized in
this study are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
Independent variables under examination
Independent Variable

Names of variable utilized
in result

Percent of population that is Black

Black

Percent of population that is Hispanic or

Hispanic or Latino(a)

Latino(a)
Mean household income

Mean income

Percent of population below the poverty

Poverty

line
Unemployment rate

Unemployment

Percent of population without health

Uninsured

insurance
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Percent of population for which the highest

Educational attainment

educational attainment for those aged 18 to
24 years is less than high school graduate
Note. Data for the independent variables is sourced from one-year estimates
from 2013 collected through The American Community Survey.
The data analysis section explains the execution of this research design.
Data Analysis
To examine the hypotheses, multivariate linear regression analyses are employed to
examine if the independent variables significantly associate with county per capita fine and fee
issuance. Prior to analysis, the assumptions of normality of residuals, linearity, homoscedasticity,
a lack of influential outliers, and a lack of multicollinearity (Pearson, 2010) were tested.
Counties are the unit of analysis as counties typically subsume jurisdiction over all non-federal
felonies, local courts, and local corrections systems. This central involvement of counties in local
criminal justice systems suggests it as the optimal unit of analysis for fine and fee studies.
Additional considerations relating to the validity of this study is discussed next.
Validity
In most quantitative projects, random sampling employs to generate generalizable
findings about populations studied. By contrast, purposive sampling is selected for this project.
Purposive sampling is sampling dictated by researcher judgment (Johnson & Reynolds, 2005, p.
590). America’s most populous counties for which data is available is the sample for this study.
It makes sense to study the most populous counties for several reasons. One reason is data for
smaller areas are especially prone to unique outliers. An example is speed-trapping for profit. In
Colorado, cities collect an average of 4 percent of revenue from traffic tickets. Yet, the
minuscule town of Campo, with a population around 100, collected 93 percent of its funding
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from traffic tickets (The Denver Post, 2015, May 15, para. 4-5). Similarly, Brookside, Alabama
has a population of 1,217 and collects nearly half of its revenue from fines (Archibald, 2022,
January 20, para. 8).
Another reason for this inclusion criterion is the most populous counties covers the
majority of the United States population; a randomized sample would likely cover a far smaller
segment of the United States population. While definitive generalizations to the entire population
of the United States are unsupportable, it is probable results obtained from this study apply to the
bulk of the country. A final reason for this sample size is due to data limitations. Outside of the
most populous counties, and even for some of the most populous counties, it is difficult to locate
data for all the variables desired for this project.
One significant limitation of this project is the lack of data available. The Census Bureau
collects fine and fee data just twice a decade. However, it is difficult to find sufficient data for
years outside of 2013. Accordingly, only 2013 figures are examined. In some instances, this may
lead to an inability to account for patterns in fine and fee issuance. For instance, a county
collecting a relatively low percentage of fines and fees per capita possibly collected a high
percentage just a few years ago and amended policies attracting criticism. This occurred when
Dallas County significantly cut its traffic citations within five years, shifting prioritization away
from revenue generation and toward public safety (Nicholson, 2013, December 3). While this
county dramatically altered its approach to fines and fees, other similar accounts appear elusive.
In short periods of time, scholars do not expect fine and fee issuance to vary significantly. Sances
and Young You (2017) drew upon 2013 municipal fine and fee data but declined to draw upon
2007 figures (the first year such data was collected), explaining “there is little variation within a
city in terms of revenues from fines over the five-year period” (p. 1091). Finally, the dependent
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and independent variables included in this study and similar research suggest the appropriateness
of these metrics in relation to the goals of this project (Sances & Young You, 2017).
A word of caution should be offered when assessing any study drawing upon census data.
While researchers frequently tap census figures, scholars should acknowledge concerns
associated with census data. The Census Bureau does not verify data reported to it. Additional
concerns involve record-keeping deficiencies, failures to respond, and varying interpretations of
questions (Edmonston & Schultze, 1995; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011b). This study confronts
these limitations with disclaimers and careful analysis of suspected errors.
Conclusion
The research questions and design coalesce to create an appropriate framework for
examining these data. Counties are a suitable unit of analysis due to their central involvement in
criminal justice operations. The chosen sample and design allow for timely and valid findings
responsive to the research question posed.
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Chapter Four
Results
The purpose of this quantitative study is to explore whether racial and/or socioeconomic
status significantly associate with fine and fee issuance. In this chapter, results are presented of
multivariate regressions conducted to answer the research question: What, if any, association is
there between race, socioeconomic disadvantage, and county fine and fee issuance? This
question reflects the hypotheses for this project:
H1: There is a positive association between fines and fees and race at the county level
H2: There is a positive association between fines and fees and socioeconomic disadvantage at the
county level
The latter hypothesis is unconfirmed in this analysis while the former is supported in the
context of Black’s, although the results indicate additional variables should be utilized in any
similar effort to predict the factors associated with fine and fee issuance. Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics for all variables.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for variables
Variable
Hispanic or
Latino(a)

n

Min

Max

Median

Mean

SD

500

1.10

95.30

7.90

13.09

14.35

Black

500

0.32

70.80

7.15

11.16

12.12

Poverty

500

3.20

42.40

15.40

15.46

5.75

Educational
attainment

500

1.90

37.40

14.20

15.07

5.78

Uninsured

500

2.80

36.40

13.55

13.80

4.98

Unemployment

500

2.20

19.90

8.20

8.47

2.67

Mean income

500

35.58

149.06

66.80

71.34

18.11
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Fines and fees

500

12.00

229.70

60.77

96.51

98.72

Note. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables under
investigation. SD indicates the spread of the data around the mean of a variable.
In Table 2, there are uneven levels of mean income, which is speculatively partially attributed to
well-known income inequality throughout the United States. Alternatively, the variations of
mean income in the data could also be partially explained as a product of the appreciable
differences in the cost of living among regions in the United States. Moreover, racial
composition sharply differing from one county to another was expected as vestiges of forced
immigration patterns dating back to slavery. In other words, the uneven spread of this data
reflects the uneven spread of income levels, and race. Finally, fine and fee levels widely variate
among counties. This asymmetry is expected in light of the non-uniform fine and fee practices
nationwide. For example, in the context of municipalities, fine and fee levels often differ
dramatically (Sances & Young You, 2017; Goldstein et al., 2020) and the same observation is
made concerning states (Maciag, 2019). The examination of Model 1 comes first.
Model 1
Model 1 tests the association between per capita fine and fee issuance and variables
representing socioeconomic disadvantage, namely: educational attainment, uninsured, poverty,
and unemployment. Results from Model 1 indicate uninsured significantly associates with
issuance of fines and fees. Table 2 provides regression results for Model 1, indicating uninsured
associates with fine and fee issuance.
Model 1 linear regression with fines and fees utilizing independent variables of poverty,
educational attainment, unemployment, and uninsured
Variable
(Intercept)
Poverty

B

SE

t

p

β

1.40

16.82

0.08

.93

0.00

-0.05

1.03

-0.05

.95

0.00
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Educational
attainment

0.08

0.82

0.10

.92

0.00

Unemployment

3.02

1.96

1.54

.12

0.08

Uninsured

5.01

1.14

4.38

< .01

0.25

2

Model Fit Statistics: F(4,49) = 11.75, p < .01, R = 0.09.
Note. (β) is the standardized Beta which ranges from -1 to 1; signaling the
strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. A
one standard deviation increase in the independent variable is associated with a
standardized beta weight percentage of a standard deviation increase or
decrease in the dependent variable. In other words, an unstandardized Beta
indicates the change in a dependent variable due to a change in the independent
variable. As such, on average, a one-unit increase of uninsured increases the
value of fines and fees by 5.01 units. (SE) represents the standard error, that is,
how much the B is expected to vary. (t) represents the test statistic which is
used to show the direction of the relationship between the independent and
dependent variable. (p) stands for p-value, which is the probability that the null
hypothesis (no relationship in the dependent variable by the independent
variable) is false. In the case of uninsured, the p and t values strongly indicate
the null hypothesis can be rejected. In other words, uninsured associates with
fine and fee issuance while poverty, educational attainment, and
unemployment fail to register an association with fine and fee issuance.
The results of the linear regression for Model 1 indicate approximately 9 percent of the variance
in fines and fees is explainable by the selected variables, revealing additional variables should be
applied in any similar future project. Levels of poverty, educational attainment, and
unemployment failed to associate with fines and fees. By contrast, uninsured associated with
fines and fees. Next is results for Model 2 which turns focus to the association between race and
fines and fees.
Model 2
In Model 2, the study shifts to the association of race through an examination of the
association between per capita fine and fee issuance, Black, and Hispanic or Latino(a). The
results from this model indicate Hispanic or Latino(a) and, especially, Black associate with fine
and fee issuance. Table 3 provides regression results for Model 2, indicating Hispanic or
Latino(a) and Black associate with fine and fee issuance
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Table 3
Model 2 linear regression with fines and fees and independent variables Hispanic or Latino(a),
and Black.
B

SE

t

p

β

(Intercept)

59.57

46.30

1.28

.19

0.00

Hispanic or
Latino(a)

1.16

0.32

3.62

< .01

0.17

Variable

2.50
0.31
Black
0.58
4.25
< .01
Model Fit Statistics: F(3,49) = 21.20, p < .01, R2 = 0.11, adj. R2 = 0.10. Note.
(β) is the standardized Beta which ranges from -1 to 1; signaling the strength of
the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. A one
standard deviation increase in the independent variable is associated with a
standardized beta weight percentage of a standard deviation increase or
decrease in the dependent variable. In other words, an unstandardized Beta
indicates the change in a dependent variable due to a change in the independent
variable. As such, on average, a one-unit increase of percent Hispanic or
Latino(a) will increase the value of fines and fees by 1.16 units. Moreover, on
average, a one-unit increase of percent Black increases the value of fines and
fees by 2.50 units. (SE) represents the standard error, that is, how much the B
is expected to vary. (t) represents the test statistic which is used to show the
direction of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable.
(p) stands for p-value, which is the probability that the null hypothesis (no
relationship in the dependent variable by the independent variable) is false. In
the cases of Black and Hispanic or Latino(a), the p and t values strongly
indicate the null hypothesis can be rejected.
The results of the linear regression model indicate approximately 11 percent of the variance in
fines and fees is explainable by the variable set. Next is results for Model 3.
Model 3
Model 3 includes the aforementioned variables, including the dependent variable, per
capita fine and fee issuance by county, as well as a moderating variable, mean income. The result
of this analysis reveals mean income, uninsured, and Black associate with fine and fee issuance.
Table 4 provides regression results for Model 3, revealing Black, uninsured, and mean income
associate with fines and fees.
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Table 4
Model 3 linear regression with fines and fees utilizing independent variables Hispanic or
Latino(a), Black, poverty, unemployment, mean income, educational attainment, and uninsured.
Variable

B

SE

t

p

β

(Intercept)

-190.66

82.05

-2.32

.021

0.00

Poverty

2.48

1.35

1.82

.068

0.14

Educational
attainment

0.49

0.81

0.59

.55

0.03

Unemployment

2.13

1.99

1.06

.28

0.06

Mean income

1.30

0.40

3.22

.01

0.24

Uninsured

4.72

1.40

3.35

< .01

0.24

Hispanic or
Latino(a)

-0.16

0.42

-0.37

.71

0.02

2.17
0.27
Black
0.60
3.56
< .01
Model Fit Statistics: F(8,49) = 11.32, p < .01, R2 = 0.15, adj. R2 = 0.14
Note. (β) is the standardized Beta which ranges from -1 to 1; signaling the strength of the
relationship between the independent and dependent variable. A one standard deviation
increase in the independent variable is associated with a standardized beta weight
percentage of a standard deviation increase or decrease in the dependent variable. In other
words, an unstandardized Beta indicates the change in a dependent variable due to a
change in the independent variable. A such, on average, a one-unit increase of mean
income will increase the value of fines and fees by 1.30 units. Also, on average, a oneunit increase of percent uninsured will increase the value of fines and fees by 4.72 units.
Finally, a one-unit increase of percent Black will increase the value of fines and fees by
2.17 units. (SE) represents the standard error, that is, how much the B is expected to vary.
(t) represents the test statistic which is used to show the direction of the relationship
between the independent and dependent variable. (p) stands for p-value, which is the
probability that the null hypothesis (no relationship in the dependent variable by the
independent variable) is false. In the cases of Black, uninsured, and mean income, the p
and t values strongly indicate the null hypothesis can be rejected.
The results of the linear regression model were significant, indicating that the variable set
explains approximately 16 percent of the variance in fines and fees. source for close connection
between race and socioeconomic status.
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Additional description of the variables is offered by way of Appendix A, which displays
percentiles for variables utilized in this study and reveals significant variation among counties in
terms of fine and fee practices as well as racial composition. Moving on from summary statistics,
diagnostic statistics are discussed next.
Diagnostic Statistics
Because several variables selected are naturally related, e.g., variables thought to
influence socioeconomic disadvantage, there was initial concern the regressed variables would
exhibit multi-collinearity. Yet, variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables under
examination reveal all variables are well within the range of acceptable collinearity (see
Appendix C for results of the VIF diagnostic conducted). Additional results of Gauss-Markov
assumptions and visual depictions thereof are presented in Appendixes D (normality), and E
(homoscedasticity), indicating asymmetrical per capita fining practices of counties.
Conclusion
The results of the three models are revealing but require further discussion. In Chapter
Five, results are further interpreted in light of the research questions and examined in
conjunction with other literature. Recommendations for further research and practice are also
presented.
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Chapter Five
Discussion
In this Chapter, conclusions derived from the results of this study on fine and fee issuance
in America’s most populated counties are described. The conclusions are based on
the purpose, research questions and results of this project. The context, 8, and limitations of these
findings and resultant recommendations based on the conclusions and purpose of the study are
also explained. Key findings for all three models are presented next.
Key Findings
Overall, the most salient finding from the regression models is percent of a county which
is Black associates with fine and fee issuance. This finding, while novel in the context of
counties, generally aligns with extant research indicating a Black population associates with fine
and fee issuance (Laisne et al., 2017; Sances & Young You, 2017) (but see contrary findings of
Muñoz & Sapp, 2003; Ruback et al., 2004). Moreover, the finding that a positive association
between fines and fees and racial composition corroborates a significant line of conflict theory
literature which conceptualizes that dominate groups view non-dominant racial groups as threats
in need of control and punishment (Blalock, 1967). In this research community, high
concentrations of politically powerless minorities predict measures of social control (Jacobs
1979; Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Liska et al., 1981; Greenberg et al., 1985; Jackson, 1986;
Chamlin, 1989; Chamlin, 1990; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sever, 2003; Barkan & Cohn, 2005;
Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Stucky, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Caravelis et al., 2011; Feldmeyer &
Ulmer, 2011). This project offers an indication that conflict theory and its emphasis on the
association between criminal justice outcomes and racial composition of place offers explanatory
power for county fine and fee issuance. While an association between race and fines and fees
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was expected, it was surprising to find no such association materialized between fines and fees
and socioeconomic status. After all, it has been argued unequal criminal justice outcomes are less
a racial problem and more of a socioeconomic one (e.g., Smith et al., 1984).
Contrary to expectations, variables measuring socioeconomic disadvantage generally fail
to associate with fine and fee issuance. Some scholars posit social control mechanisms, such as
fines and fees, increase in areas disadvantaged socioeconomically (Vold, 2002). Yet, this study
did not generally find support for such an assertion. In fact, the results from this project indicate
fines and fees tend to be issued more per capita in areas with elevated income levels. The results
indicate mean income associates with fine and fee issuance, further suggesting poorer counties
are less likely to issue fines and fees than more affluent counties. This project offers an
indication that conflict theory and its general emphasis on the association between criminal
justice outcomes and socioeconomic disadvantage fails to offer explanatory power for county
fine and fee issuance. It is noteworthy that mean income appears to associate with fine and fee
issuance. This finding may corroborate theory indicating the more affluent an area is, the more
there is a felt need and apparent ability to socially control vis-à-vis fine and fee issuance. After
all, conflict theorists have long argued the more unequal a society, the more elites desire and are
able to socially control the less fortunate through the criminal justice system (Jacobs, 1979, p.
922-23; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 33). Given that mean income appears to associate with
fine and fee issuance, it could be speculated that high income areas have a disproportionate
number of citizens with a preference and ability to influence social control via fine and fee
issuance. Nonetheless, it appears socioeconomic disadvantage of a county does not associate
with fine and fee issuance, casting doubt on the explanatory power of a theory indicating that
criminal justice responses elevate in locations where socioeconomic status is low.
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The one variable representing socioeconomic disadvantage associating with fine and fee
issuance is uninsured. It is speculated the significantly positive association between fines and
fees and uninsured may be partly attributable to the historically low relative rate of health
insurance coverage in those jurisdictions which feature aggressive fine and fee policies, e.g.,
Georgia (Miller, 2019, September 10).
Context of Findings
It is surprising socioeconomic status of counties fails to generally associate with county
fine and fee issuance. It is noteworthy, however, uninsured associates with county fine and fee
issuance. One factor with possible explanatory power for why uninsured strongly associates with
fine and fee issuance is uninsured rates are elevated for some states which have counties with the
highest fine and fee per capita rates. Georgia, for example, is home to 16 of the 26 counties with
the highest per capita issuance of fines and fees per the dataset utilized in this study. 30 Georgia
also has historically had one of the three highest rates of uninsured citizens (Miller, 2019,
September 10). Additionally, Blacks disproportionality are without insurance, which may
explain some of this association. The association between Black’s and fine and fee issuance
deserves additional context as well.
The positive association between Black population and fines and fees is striking upon
consideration that there is no other positive association between any other race and fines and fees

As discussed in the note for Appendix B, it should come as little surprise that Georgia has 16 of the 26 counties
with the highest per capita issuance of fines and fees per the dataset utilized in this study. According to one study,
Georgia ranks last among states in terms of state laws appearing most conducive to fine and fee issuance, in the
context of municipalities (Institute for Justice, April 30, 2020). This finding, however, is likely to extend to counties
for several reasons. In Georgia, there are weak procedural safeguards for people facing ordinance prosecutions, and
comparatively little flexibility in payment plans for those owing fines and fees. (Institute for Justice, April 30, 2020).
Others have pointed to additional reasons why Georgia appears to be especially prone to high fine and fee issuance,
including the facts that Georgia criminalizes traffic offenses, local governments are permitted to contract with
private probation companies (Shannon & Martin, 2017), and Georgia is in a small minority of states with a private
probation system (Harris et al., 2017).
30
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when a host of socioeconomic variables are controlled for. Given that mean income also
positively associates with fine and fee issuance, 31 it does not appear that counties relying most
heavily upon fines and fees are the most financially destitute counties although many of these
counties appear to have elevated levels of residents without health insurance. It does appear,
however, counties with significantly sized Black populations tend to rely more heavily upon
fines and fees. This finding is in line with the conflict theory literature which theorizes that
Blacks are specifically considered a threat to conventional order and, in turn, targeted for
criminal justice penalties. An association between per capita Black population and mean income
of county residents with fines and fees was not wholly unexpected as Sances and Young You
(2017) found that per capita Black population and per capita income robustly relate to municipal
per capita fines and fees issued. Similarly, in the context of California traffic stops, Singla, et al.
(2020) found racial composition is the factor most closely associating with fine and fee issuance.
The findings of this project are also consistent with conflict theory literature.
The conflict theory literature reviewed in Chapter Two suggests much of society views
Blacks as a threat to conventional order. Moreover, conflict theory literature suggests the
supposed threat Blacks pose to conventional order leads to disproportionate applications of

31

With regard to mean income, it is speculated counties with higher incomes may be more likely than poorer
counties to rely on fines and fees to discourage offenses. For instance, the county in the dataset fining most per
capita is Sangamon County, Illinois. This county encompasses the capital of Illinois, Springfield. According to one
estimate, the Black population of Springfield is around 12 percent (Charles et al., 2019, January 14). Interestingly, in
this county, Black median income is 42 percent of White income, the most significant discrepancy in the nation.
Moreover, Black unemployment is triple that of White unemployment. (Charles et al., 2019, January 14). It may
appear counterintuitive that fine and fee practices are characterized by relatively high levels of per capita income.
Studies addressing poverty and crime, however, tend to stress poverty relative to the community is more strongly
related to social problems than actual poverty levels (Patterson, 1991). In this vein, some scholars view inequality
relatively, postulating some of most significant drawbacks of poverty are not about being poor per se; it is about
living in poverty in the face of comparatively great wealth. As put by Vold and Bernard (1986): "Poverty is always
in part a subjective condition, relative to what others have, rather than any simple objective fact of the presence or
absence of a certain amount of property or other measure of wealth" (p. 138).
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criminal justice sanctions toward Black Americans - especially in areas where Blacks may seem
particularly threatening to established social order, e.g., affluent areas with relatively high mean
incomes.
Implications of Findings
The implication that racial composition of place may associate with elevated levels of
fine and fee issuance is important in terms of policy, practice, and theory. Policymakers and
policy influencers should be made aware of the apparent tendency to issue fines and fees in areas
with relatively significant Black populations. Perhaps, some involved in the policy formation
process in areas with high per capita Black populations will effort to ensure their citizens are
fined less, not more, than communities with less color. Some may dismiss the importance of
finding a correlational association between fines and fees and racial composition of place. After
all, there are surely omitted variables which could help explain elevating levels of fine and fee
issuance in counties with high per capita Black populations. By contrast, others find instances of
racial disparity in the criminal justice significant and possibly indicating systemic racism defined
by the President of the NAACP as, “systems and structures that have procedures or processes
that disadvantages African Americans.” (Yancey-Bragg, 2020, para., 5). Although deeper
exploration awaits, it appears that the fine and fee system disadvantages Black Americans at the
county level – this is an implication that appears to matter, at least, to some. Additional
implications of the results of this study involve the association of race, and socioeconomic
disadvantage, especially as these concepts relate to the lack of intergenerational socioeconomic
mobility in America for those born poor or Black.
Given the close association between race and socioeconomic status, one may ask: What
implication does this close relationship have when socioeconomic status is controlled for? Given
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that racial disparities persisted after controlling for socioeconomic disadvantage, it appears
socioeconomic disadvantage offers less explanatory power for fine and fee issuance than does
race. Nonetheless, the impact socioeconomic disadvantage may have could be underrepresented
by the results. For example, the lack of wealth mobility for those born into poverty is a risk
factor for involvement with the criminal justice system (Sariaslan et al., 2014). Moreover,
because Blacks experience less intergenerational socioeconomic mobility than other racial
groups (Chetty et al., 2020), it could be predominantly Black counties experience far less
socioeconomic mobility. In fact, there is some suggestion that this is the case. Chetty et al., 2020
find those born in the Southeast United States (most of the states with higher per capita Black
populations) experience the lowest intergenerational upward socioeconomic mobility. In the
dataset, many of the counties which issued the most fines and fees per capita are from counties
situated in the Southeastern United States. For myriad reasons, a lack of socioeconomic mobility
could contribute the lack of economic health of an area, perhaps contributing to elevated fine and
fee rates. Moreover, such socioeconomic immobility may be indicative of a lack of economic
avenues to flourish economically within the bounds of the law. Accordingly, while
socioeconomic status does not appear to significantly associate with the fine and fee issuance of
a county, it may be that socioeconomic mobility or lack thereof does significantly associate with
county fine and fee issuance. A limitation of this project is that it only provides a static measure
of socioeconomic disadvantage while failing to include a measure of intergenerational
socioeconomic mobility which may shed further light on the characteristics of counties fining the
most per capita. Additional limitations abound.
Limitations
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Data for this project is from 2013. While it is important to retroactively study criminal
justice practices, updated studies are always needed and, often, preferable. There is also, of
course, problems attendant with omitted variables which may shed even further light on what
factors most strongly associate with fine and fee issuance.
Another limitation of this study may be bias. It was hypothesized race and socioeconomic
status would predict fine and fee issuance. As such, this hypothesis contributed to the variable
selection. In addition to possibly overlooking key variables, this analysis only addressed the
largest counties for which data was available. A focus on smaller counties or other units of
government may be promising as well. The issue of race is addressed solely by utilizing Blacks
and Hispanic or Latino(a) as variables. In a study focused on a few or one unit of government,
indigenous and immigrant populations should also be considered in any variable set. Additional
recommendations are presented next.
Recommendations for Future Research and Practice
Further research of fines and fees is encouraged. A review of nationwide fine and fee
levels is problematic due to data limitations. Accordingly, government agencies involved in the
collection and reporting of data should effort toward making this data more accessible and
accurate, particularly on the county level. Understanding why some localities rely more heavily
on fines and fees is an endeavor increasingly pursued by the scholarly community, but the
success of these efforts depends upon quality of data available.
One variable absent for this study is a measure of local government fiscal well-being, a
variable thought to relate to fine and fee issuance (Shapiro, 2014, May 19; Semuels, 2016, July
5; Shaw, 2016, September 26). For this project, reliable budgetary data for the counties studied
was unavailable. Future researchers able to find a reliable measure of fiscal well-being of
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governments are encouraged to include such a variable in their projects as several suspect fiscal
difficulties are a key driver of fine and fee issuance (Shapiro, 2014, May 19; Semuels, 2016, July
5; Shaw, 2016, September 26). In addition to county budgets, future researchers may also be
well-served by incorporating county political culture in future analyses.
Another variable perhaps promising in fine and fee research is income inequality,
commonly measured by Gini coefficients. For this project, dozens of hours were spent collecting
Gini coefficients for the 500 countries included in the variable set. Yet, it ultimately turned out
that this data was unavailable for far too many counties. This was also the case for population
density, a variable Sances and Young You (2017) previously found to associate with fine and fee
issuance, in the context of municipalities. Moreover, the variable sets employed failed to explain
much of the variance in county fine and fee issuance. As such, an expanded variable set is
strongly advised for future research.
Not only is this project limited by the variable set, the variables chosen could be altered
further and, in turn, provide an even clearer picture of fine and fee issuance. For example, a
research decision was made not to subject the per capita fine and fee variable to a cost of living
adjustment. Cost of living is uneven, sometimes dramatically, across the United States. A
research team with superior resources could design a study accounting for the variations in the
cost of living across the country while still keeping in mind that, to an indigent, a fine in an
affluent area of California is likely no more financially injurious than a fine issued for the same
amount in a comparatively destitute area of West Virginia where cost of living is dramatically
lower. In addition to improvements in data, fine and fee research may also be advanced through
further study, qualitative and quantitative alike.
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One avenue for further study is the qualitative studies of fines and fees. I speculate that
such research may lead to theory formation in terms of why certain governments rely upon fines
and fees and, perhaps more critically, the consequences of fines and fees as experienced by those
charged with satisfying significant sums owed to their local government. 32
Possibilities abound too for additional quantitative investigation of fine and fee practices.
At present, studies address fine and fees on the national and local levels. Some studies focus on
the national level while others direct attention to one or a few units of government. Regardless of
the sample used, future research should also investigate additional variables to assist the
scholarly community as it develops a more comprehensive conceptual framework of that which
associates with fines and fees.
In addition to an expanded variable set, future researchers should proceed with caution
when evaluating laws and policies relating to fines and fees. There are innumerable opportunities
for a citizen to incur a fine and fee, a consideration future researcher may take into account when
measuring and examining fine and fee issuance. Future researchers may also note while many
justice systems offer discretion in the issuing and collection of fine and fees it is sometimes
difficult to know if and how this discretion is applied (Harris et al., 2017, p. 4). Moreover,
governmental units have non-uniform jurisdictional laws, lacking uniformity on paper and,
especially, in application. For this reason, comparisons based upon multiple governmental units
should be made with caution especially when indicating uneven levels of fines and fees across
jurisdictions. A compelling argument may be made that studies concerning fine and fee issuance
should focus on a few or even one county. By doing so, a researcher may focus closely on that

Cadigan & Kirk (2020), for example, rely upon qualitative interviews to study how fine and fee issuance may
counterintuitively strain labor market participation as many with outstanding fines and fees suffer in the job market
because fine and fee issuance leads to arrests, driver licensing revocation, etc.
32
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county, particularly its finances in a way impossible when studies hundreds of counties. While
studying the census data appears helpful for offering a 10,000-foot overview of fine and fee
issuance, there is no practical means to verify the reliability of all the data for hundreds of
jurisdictions. Moreover, regardless of number of counties sampled, future researchers should
control any study by measuring the racial composition of county leadership. Sances & Young
You (2017) investigated the role Black city council representation may have on municipal fine
and fee issuance, finding the association between race and fines and fees was significantly
mitigated by the presence of Black city council members. In addition to suggestions for future
research, there are suggestions for policy improvements.
Fine and fee reform has been proposed frequently (Vallas & Patel, 2012; Department of
Justice, 2016, March 27). Generally, there are calls for more considerate, accommodating, and
charitable fine and fee polices (Department of Justice, 2016, March 27). On the one hand, some
reformers seem to focus on proactive safeguards preventing the application of fine and fees to
those with doubtful ability to pay. On the other hand, others seem to focus less on preventing
fines and fees and more on ensuring failures to pay do not lead to arrests (Vallas & Patel, 2012).
While the merits of various fine and fee reforms are debatable, there is no debate that the
United States Supreme Court requires that indigent defendants avoid incarceration for nonwillfully failing to pay fines and fees. As such, it is imperative Courts, at sentencing, make a
meaningful determination as to whether a defendant will be able to satisfy any fines and fees
imposed. In the past, many jurisdictions have failed to meaningfully inquire whether a defendant
is likely able to pay court-ordered fines and fees, e.g.’s, Washington v. Stone (2012); People v.
Corrales (2013). Accordingly, it is proposed that every sentencing judge in the country make a
meaningful review, on the record, of whether and to what extent a defendant is likely able to
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satisfy fines and fees issued, including bail. Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has
incorporated the Excessive Fine Clause to the states (Timbs v. Indiana (2019), it is also
recommended state-level judges make a finding as to whether or not a fine or fee is excessive.
Such policies would presumably dramatically reduce the application of fines and fees and their
attendant problems as discussed throughout this study. Moreover, it is unlikely adoption of such
policies would meaningfully reduce the funding of local governments as indigent defendants are
unlikely to pay the fines and fees issued in the first place. If a particular judge is unable to make
a determination on the ability to pay fines and fees, no fines and fees should be issued. Of
course, other laws would need to be amended as well; in most jurisdictions, state statues or local
ordinances often require a minimum fine for an offense, such as littering.
For this reason, it is proposed every level of government pass legislation or announce
policy making it clear a judge is unobligated to issue fines and fees for any offense. Nonetheless,
fines and fees will be issued to some defendants. In many cases, these fines and fees will be
payable. In other cases, however, an individual will become unable to pay fines and fees and risk
incarceration or other consequences. Normatively, it seems unfair to require someone to pay a
fine which is unpayable in any sort of realistic sense. Moreover, normatively, it seems just that a
justice system only incarcerates those able to pay a fine but who refuse to do so.
In order to safeguard against incarcerating for a fine or fee with doubtful ability to pay, it
is proposed all state legislatures codify the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Beck v.
Elmore County, 2021. This case stands for the proposition that it is unconstitutional to issue
arrest warrants for unpaid fines and fees in cases where the court has not conducted an anility to
pay hearing (Beck v. Elmore County, 2021). A conservative Idaho Supreme Court made this
ruling which appears to be in line with Supreme Court precedent, Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
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660 (1983). Those states continuing to issue arrest warrants in these circumstances may face
Department of Justice investigations which, ironically, may lead to fines. South Dakota, for
example, currently has in place policies which may place her under federal investigation,
depending upon who is at the helm of the Justice Department. I propose additional changes to
South Dakota’s fine and fee laws as well.
In South Dakota, a court may (but is not required to) consider incarceration-free
alternatives such as community service instead of being issued a fine (SDCL § 23A-27-25.1).
The aforementioned Department of Justice memo, however, suggests court systems risk
investigation and litigation unless the following requirement is satisfied: “Courts must consider
alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay fines and fees” (Department of
Justice, 2016, p. 2). As such, I propose SDCL § 23A-27-25.1 be amended to replace the
permissive term “may” to the mandatory term “shall” in association with community service. By
substituting this one term, South Dakota courts would need to make findings, on the record,
indicating that it considered alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay
fines and fees. Requiring judges to consider community serve in lieu of fines and fees would
allow some defendants to satisfy their obligation to the state, something which, at present is, at
times, seemingly impossible.
Conclusion
By now, it is axiomatic to observe that the criminal justice system in the United States is
a system subject of many of the most profound controversies of this time. While fine and fee
issuance may be largely unfeatured in popular media, it is the most frequently used criminal
justice penalty. While this penalty is seemingly non-dramatic and relatively innocuous, the
frequency of fining replenishes government coffers but often at grave expense for those fined. A
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long line of literature and a furious chorus of advocates of criminal justice reform point to
inequalities of social status and race as the likely factors leading to uneven application of
criminal justice policies. On the one hand, this study is able to corroborate an association
between fine and fee issuance and race.
On the other hand, and in contradistinction to the findings of race vis-à-vis fine and fees,
this study was unable to corroborate an association between fine and fee issuance and
socioeconomic status of a county. While it is well-known poorer areas historically and especially
suffer from elevated crime rates, an association between poorer areas and fine and fee issuance
did not materialize in this project. This finding, however, makes it more remarkable that areas
with high per capita Black populations associate with elevated fine and fee issuance. This finding
seems to lend credence to the literature predicting criminal justice sanctions are elevated in
proportion to the per capita Black population.
Moreover, that income level positively associates with fine and fee issuance perhaps
indicates areas which are generally affluent but also have a significant Black population may
view Blacks as a threat to order and, as such, may rely more heavily upon fines and fees to
subjugate Black populations. If so, it appears there may be some credence in a long line of
literature suggesting America has long applied criminal justice sanctions more harshly towards
Blacks in order to fight back against the supposed threat for which Black’s have often been
identified as proxy.
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Appendix A
Percentiles for variables
Hispanic
or
Latino(a)

Black

Unemployed

Poverty

Educational
attainment

Mean
income

Uninsured

10%

2.70

1.00

7.70

7.90

8.50

53.61

7.70

10.26

20%

3.90

2.00

9.28

10.50

10.18

57.27

9.28

20.55

11.57

11.17

59.09

10.00

20.84

Percentile

Fines and fees

25%

4.50

2.67

10.00

30%

5.07

3.40

10.70

12.50

11.87

60.72

10.70

30.93

40%

6.30

5.36

12.16

14.00

12.90

63.22

12.16

50.24

50%

7.90

7.15

13.55

15.40

14.20

66.80

13.55

60.77

60%

10.00

9.84

15.10

16.70

15.80

70.21

15.10

80.48

70%

13.03

12.46

16.23

18.03

17.63

75.34

16.23

100.96

75%

15.70

14.67

16.90

18.92

18.60

79.16

16.90

120.94

80%

18.92

18.02

17.60

19.62

19.74

83.24

17.60

140.35

90%

29.37

26.22

19.91

22.30

23.00

94.43

19.91

220.23

Note. Significant variation exists in fine and fee practices as well as other variables.
As revealed in the dataset, outliers are present in the fine and fee data. The presence
of such outliers is attributed, in large part, because some counties depart from others
in terms of fine and fee practices. For example, according to the dataset utilized in
this study, 16 of the 26 counties with the highest per capita issuance of fines and
fees are from Georgia. Shannon & Martin (2017) describe how Georgia's fine and
fee framework departs from other states because Georgia criminalizes traffic
offenses, and local governments are allowed to contract with private probation
companies who have come under fire for fining practices (p. 47). It also bears
mention Georgia is one of few states with a private probation system which is often
accused of profiting off fine and fee laws (Harris et al., 2017). A research decision
was made to include such counties because doing so sheds further light on which
counties are fining most per capita. Removing jurisdictions such as Georgia from
the dataset would lead to the untenable position of obscuring where fines and fees
are most prevalent and, in turn, obscure policies contributing to such fine and fee
activity as well as the experiences of residents of those jurisdictions. There are
growing appeals to hear voices in this country from those taking issue with the
status quo of the criminal justice system. In a sense, data used for this project is a
proxy for such voices.
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Appendix B
Variance Inflation Factors for variables
Variance Inflation Factors:
Variable
VIF
Poverty
3.624
Educational attainment
1.336
Unemployed
1.692
Uninsured
2.934
Hispanic or Latino(a)
2.232
Black
3.250
Note. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were calculated to detect the presence
of multicollinearity between variables. High VIFs indicate increased effects of
multicollinearity in the model. VIFs greater than 5 are cause for concern,
whereas VIFs of 10 should be considered the maximum upper limit (Menard,
2009). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs less than 4.
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Appendix C
A histogram of the residuals from the regression analysis

Note. Histogram of variables included in the study. In this histogram, distribution residuals are
compared to a normal distribution (a theoretical distribution following a bell curve). Normality
may be assumed if there is a normal curve, indicating that the assumption of the normality of the
residuals was not violated. As the histogram reveals, the curve sways to the left, indicating a
non-normal distribution of residuals. This non-normal distribution is likely owed to the presence
of various outliers found in the dataset and depicted as the abnormally distant bars on the right
side of the histogram. While non-normal outliers are generally excluded, the outliers in this study
represent interesting and important information about which counties issue the most fines and
fees on a per capita basis. To exclude outliers in this study would result in obscuring those
counties which fine most per capita and, by extension, limit our knowledge of the demographic
composition of such counties. As revealed in the dataset and literature reviewed, outliers are
present in the fine and fee data because certain counties depart from others in terms of fine and
fee practices.
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Appendix D
Model testing the assumption of homoscedasticity for variables

Note. A scatterplot of predicted values and model residuals for Model 1. Homoscedasticity was
evaluated by plotting the residuals alongside the predicted values (Bates et al., 2014; Field, 2013;
Osborne & Walters, 2002). Robust standard errors were used. The assumption of
homoscedasticity (equal scatter) is met if the points appear randomly distributed with a mean of
zero and without apparent curvature. When homoscedasticity is not present, heteroscedasticity
occurs. As the above figure illustrates, there is some heteroscedasticity, although much of the
data is homeostatic. This finding of heteroscedasticity is likely owed to significant ranges in
value sizes in the dataset as there is a wide gulf between the largest and smallest observed values.
Such values are expected due to the variance in variable values, e.g., the asymmetrical per capita
fining practices of counties.
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